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TOO STRICT?
RICHARD B. COLLINS*
Should the strict scrutiny standard' govern judicial review of
claims that government has burdened religious freedom? American law's
patchwork of rules applies that demanding standard to some claims but
denies meaningful review to others. Clear standards forbid burdening
religious belief, as distinct from religiously motivated action, and subject
deliberate discrimination against religious practices to strict scrutiny.3
For other claims, an apparent difficulty arises from issues before courts
that depend on the truth or importance of religious belief. The dominant
rule in American case law forbids secular courts to determine these ques-
tions.4 The point can be readily illustrated by disputes about religious
speech. Most questions can be decided based on rules that apply to all
forms of expression, thereby avoiding any need to evaluate religious
dogma.5 But two of the most important exceptions to free speech protec-
Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks for review and com-
ments at a University of Colorado workshop and colloquia at La Trobe University,
Melbourne, and at the University of Auckland, and for research assistance of Amber
Widgery, Colorado Law class of 2014, and of Alex Koral, Colorado Law class of
2015.
1. For a recent Supreme Court definition of strict scrutiny, see Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 540 U.S _._ , 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) ("[W]hen gov-
ernment decisions 'touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is enti-
tled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."') (quoting Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)).
2. See infra Part 11.
3. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533 (1993). Courts regularly recite absolute protection for religious beliefs, but
contests about beliefs are rare.
4. See infra Parts II.B, E.
5. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940).
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6tion, fraud and defamation, require judicial determinations of truth. As a
result, some religious hucksters and defamers get a free pass.
The vexing issues about truth or importance of religious beliefs
arise from demands for religious exemptions from facially neutral, gen-
erally applicable laws. These demands can be made by defendants, such
as those accused of fraud or slander, or by plaintiffs seeking to establish
an exemption. In either case, the established prima facie case for an ex-
emption is to allege and prove that a law or administrative action impos-
es a substantial burden on one's religious freedom.7 Like any litigant's
claim, allegations of belief or burden might be false. Courts can some-
times decide whether claims are true and burdens are substantial based
on historical records of a long-established faith or because the claimed
burden is economic rather than spiritual. But many novel or individual
claims to spiritual burden have no external basis for evaluation, and even
historical records can present questions beyond the competence of secu-
lar courts.9 As a result, many religious freedom claims are accepted as
true and substantial with no proof except the claim itself, forcing review
to be based on other criteria. If the only other criterion is the compelling
interest part of the strict scrutiny test, then courts face a dilemma: the on-
ly way to reject any claim of spiritual burden, weighty or trivial, honest
or fraudulent, is to find the government's action narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest, a standard that the strict scrutiny test
purports to make very difficult to satisfy. Even if, as is often the case, a
court thinks a claim before it should be sustained, it will often sense a
slippery slope problem-how could an extended claim of the same sort,
one that might pose greater problems for government or other persons, be
rejected if it, too, must pass strict scrutiny?
The Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith'I held that the strict scruti-
ny standard is inappropriate for most religious exemption claims that in-
6. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. _, _, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544
(2012) (dictum) (fraud); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16.35(b)(iv) (8th ed. 2010) (defamation).
7. See infra Part 1.B.
8. See infra Part II.C-D.
9. See id.
10. See infra Part I1.F.
11. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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voke the Free Exercise Clause. The Court's opinion relied on some of
the problems arising from courts' inability to determine religious truth."
But the Court failed to replace strict scrutiny with any form of meaning-
ful review, leaving most issues in this realm to the political process.14
Congress tried to fill that void with statutory causes of action that revived
the strict scrutiny standard to govern many religious freedom claims, but
it failed to address the standard's shortcomings identified by the Court.
15
The result is a set of rules that gives judicial protection against some fair-
ly moderate and indirect burdens on religious freedom, often those of po-
litically dominant faiths, but evades meaningful review of more serious
interferences to minority faiths, particularly to those of American Indian
religions. 16
Exemption claims can be challenged as preferences, that is, on
equality grounds. 17 The issue is routinely addressed in lawsuits by oppo-
nents of religious exemptions adopted by legislatures or administrators,
but for various reasons, it is not often invoked as a government's defense
in lawsuits seeking Judicial exemptions.18 When the preference claim
12. See id. The majority opinion avoided use of the term "strict scrutiny" to
refer to the standard it rejected, preferring the term "compelling interest," which ap-
pears numerous times, e.g., 494 U.S. at 883, 886-88. That was the term used when
heightened Free Exercise scrutiny was formally adopted in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963). See 494 U.S. at 883-84. As explained infra, text accompanying
notes 57-70, Sherbert was decided before the strict scrutiny term had become a
standard part of the constitutional lexicon. However, there can be no doubt that
Sherbert involved a heightened scrutiny standard, requiring a "compelling state in-
terest" to justify burdens on religious freedom and finding none on the record. 374
U.S. at 403, 406. Moreover, by the time of the Smith decision, proponents of the
Sherbert rule described it as a strict scrutiny test. See 494 U.S. at 894-94 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S.
136, 141 (1987) (describing the Sherbert test as strict scrutiny)). Congress certainly
thought so when it embedded the strict scrutiny test in its statutory reaction to the
Smith decision. See infra text accompanying note 76. In addition, scholars have
commonly referred to the standard Smith rejected as the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g.,
2 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 81-82
(2011).
13. 494 U.S. at 885-89.
14. Id. at 885.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. Id.
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does appear, the vehicle for review is the Establishment Clause. 9 Con-
fusing and shifting standards regarding the Establishment Clause have
made this an uncertain measure.20 However, the Supreme Court's 2005
decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson offered possible clarity. The case re-
viewed the validity of a federal statute passed in reaction to Smith. 2 The
Cutter Court rejected plaintiffs facial attack, but it outlined sensible
rules in dicta for as-applied review that rely on the Establishment Clause
23
and modify strict scrutiny. For reasons not apparent, governments de-
fending religious freedom claims were slow to invoke these guidelines
24until the recent Hobby Lobby litigation. The federal statutes' incom-
plete coverage leaves some religious exemption claims to state laws,S 25
which vary considerably, but if the Cutter scheme succeeds, it could
26lead to more uniform protections.
This article argues that the strict scrutiny standard alone is ill-
suited to evaluate most religious freedom claims. At the same time, the
Supreme Court's 1990 abandonment of constitutional strict scrutiny and
failure to adopt a suitable alternative2 led to the present disorder in the
law. The Court's dicta in Cutter point to a reasonable solution, but adop-
tion of the Cutter guidelines is uncertain.
28
The sections that follow first briefly review the history of the
Supreme Court's religious freedom decisions. Part II analyzes how
courts applying the strict scrutiny rule have addressed the problem of
evaluating the truth and importance of claimed religious beliefs. Part III
reviews the string of failed claims by followers of American Indian faiths
who have sought protection of their religious interests in public lands.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
22. See id. at 720-24. See also infra Part IV.A.
23. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719-24.
24. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014).
25. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A
Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010); W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs
and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 665 (1999).
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990),
28. See infra Part IV.
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Part IV addresses the tension between religious exemption claims and
principles of constitutional equality and their possible resolution by the
Cutter dicta. Part IV also discusses how religious exemption claims are
addressed under the European Convention and other human rights re-
gimes. Part V discusses other religious exemption topics of current legal
interest: issues about prisoners' diets, medical treatment of children, con-
traception, and refugees.
I. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE COURTS
A. Rules
Present law applies a broad array of legal standards to religious
freedom issues. Most claims based on the Free Exercise Clause receive
minial jdicil .29
minimal judicial scrutiny. The major exception is for cases of deliberate
discrimination against a particular faith, which is subject to strict scruti-30 . 3
ny. Claims arising under two federal statutes also get strict scrutiny.
31
Another federal statute gives individual workers significant but flexible
protection without applying the strict scrutiny formula.32 Religious ex-
29. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith's dicta retained heightened review of
claims of deliberate discrimination against a faith, of what the Court called "hybrid"
claims involving another constitutional right, and of claims involving "individual-
ized government assessment." Id. at 884. Claims to autonomy by religious organiza-
tions were cited favorably and thus also survived. Id. at 887.
30. See id. at 877-78; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
31. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2012); Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012).
32. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to require that employers accommodate employees' reli-
gious exercise claims to a reasonable extent. The 1964 Act simply forbade discrimi-
nation in employment on the basis of religion but did not require exemptions. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). The 1972 amendment mandated reasonable exemptions
by defining "religion" as "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommo-
date to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j).
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pression has strong protection under the Free Speech Clause, often based
on the strict scrutiny standard. 33 Establishment Clause review of claims
to freedom from religion has its own set of heightened review stand-
ards.34 State statutes and constitutions further complicate the mix.35 No
one thinks the legal landscape is appropriate. Advocates for religious
freedom seek strict scrutiny of all claims and argue that courts do not
properly enforce the federal statutes.36 Their opponents raise Establish-
ment Clause and equality objections.37 Nothing resembling a uniform
approach is in sight. Moreover, an empirical description of claims that
fail and those that succeed seems bizarre. Some fairly modest religious
freedom claims are vigorously protected, while serious invasions are held
not to state a cause of action.
38
Events leading to today's disarray are a mix of constitutional rul-
ings and statutes. Founding-era conflicts over state establishments and
resulting discriminations against religious minorities were famous
events,39 but their modem relevance is at most indirect. Salient events for
the rest of the nineteenth century were mostly political. Catholic efforts
33. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305
(1940). See also Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment
Protections: Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious
Freedom? 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 448 (2006).
34. See infra Part IV.
35. See supra note 25.
36. See Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest,
and Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021, 1054 (2012); Douglas Laycock,
Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations and Ex-
pedient Post-Modernisms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2011); Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of Religious Accommodation: The Case
of RLUIPA, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 1923-24 (2011). See generally Ira Lupu,
Federalism and Faith Redux, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 935 (2009).
37. See, e.g., Rend Reyes, The Fading Free Exercise Clause, 19 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 725, 750 (2011); Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion:
The Need For a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 24 (2010); Christo-
pher C. Lund, Exploring Free Exercise Doctrine: Equal Liberty and Religious Ex-
emptions, 77 TENN. L. REV. 351, 373 (2009); Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1272 (2008).
38. See infra Part I.B.
39. See Wesley J. Campbell, Religious Neutrality in the Early Republic, 24
REGENT U. L. REV. 311,327 (2011).
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to gain tax support for religious schools failed.40 The Government sup-
ported and subsidized Christian missionaries trying to convert American
Indian people.4' Only two important matters reached the Supreme Court.
When a Presbyterian congregation in Kentucky split apart over slavery,
42
the Court held that courts must defer to church authorities. The other
was the federal government's successful campaign to outlaw Mormon
polygamy. 43 In the century's most famous decision, the Court rejected
Mormons' claim to protection of the Free Exercise Clause; the decision
is usually said to interpret the Clause to protect only beliefs, not acts of
religious obligation."
Supreme Court decisions in the 1920s first protected religious
freedom, ruling that states could not outlaw private religious schools
45
nor forbid them to teach foreign languages.4 6 But the Court's reasoning
in these cases was at most indirectly connected to the Free Exercise
Clause. The opinions relied exclusively on the Court's substantive due
process doctrine to hold that parents' constitutional liberty to determine
their children's education outweighed competing state interests; the reli-
gion clauses were not mentioned.4 7
40. See Aaron E. Schwartz, Dusting Off the Blaine Amendment: Two Chal-
lenges to Missouri's Anti-Establishment Tradition, 72 Mo. L. REV. 339, 370 (2007).
41. See Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of
Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native America
Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 776-77 (1997).
42. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1871).
43. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (sustaining U. S. government's dissolution of LDS Church
corporation and seizure of its assets because of its promotion of polygamy); Elijah L.
Milne, Blaine Amendments and Polygamy Laws: The Constitutionality of Anti-
Polygamy Laws Targeting Religion, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 269 (2006).
44. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Some scholars have opined
that the decision rested on broader grounds. See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The First
Amendment's Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court's Con-
temporary Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 GA. L. REV. 81 (1994) (arguing that the
Reynolds Court found polygamy to be immoral and contrary to American values so
that its suppression was justified, rather than on exclusion of any protection for ac-
tions inspired by religion).
45. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce also involved a mil-
itary academy that made no religious freedom claim.
46. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
47. Notwithstanding, there is a persistent practice of academic revision to
claim that the decisions did rely on the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., James C.
20141
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW rvol. 13
Modem law on religious freedom is customarily dated from the
Supreme Court's 1940 decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut,48 which held
that the Free Exercise Clause protects actions as well as beliefs and re-
stricts state governments under the incorporation doctrine.49 The Court
also indicated that some level of heightened review applied, but it in-
voked Free Speech precedents:
In the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to de-
fine and punish specific conduct as constituting a
clear and present danger to a substantial interest of
the State, the petitioner's communication, consid-
ered in the light of the constitutional guarantees,
raised no such clear and present menace to public
peace and order as to render him liable to convic-S50
tion of the common law offense in question.
Moreover, for the first twenty years or so under that standard,
claims reaching appellate courts involved religious expression, claims
that are now evaluated under the Free Speech Clause rather than under
the Free Exercise Clause.5'
Claims for religious exemptions unrelated to speech reached the
Court in the 1960s, in parallel with activist decisions enforcing the Estab-
12lishment Clause. The two strains coalesced in unsuccessful attempts to
Harkins, IV, Of Textbooks and Tenets: Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Educa-
tion and the Free Exercise of Religion, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 985, 986 n.6 (1988).
48. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
49. Id. at 310.
50. Id. at 311 (citing Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)). See also
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 246 (1937); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
51. See e.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953). See Susan Gellman
& Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion
Cases (Not Just the Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665, 712 (2008).
52. See Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality:
The Constitutional Argument for Non-preferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2005).
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outlaw Sunday closing laws.53 But the Court's 1963 decision in Sherbert
v. Verner54 hardened the free exercise test into the compelling interest
formulation that became the heart of the strict scrutiny doctrine. 55 In
1972, Congress mandated some protection for religious interests of em-
ployees, but the statute does not use the strict scrutiny formula.
6
The Court created the now-familiar strict scrutiny test gradually
over several decades. The idea is often traced to Justice Stone's celebrat-
ed footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 57 though he did
not use those words.5 s The phrase "strict scrutiny" in its modern individ-
ual rights sense first appeared in Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court
in Skinner v. Oklahoma,59 which overturned the state's "three-strikes-
and-you're-castrated" law.60 Another famous occasion was Justice
61Black's dictum in Korematsu v. United States stating that racial classi-
fications are "immediately suspect" and require "the most rigid scruti-
n,62ny.
The companion "compelling interest" wording was first stated in
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in McCollum v. Board of Edu-
cation,63 which outlawed officially sanctioned Bible classes in public
schools as an Establishment Clause violation. 64 The two phrases were
first used together in Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson,
65
in which the Court overturned states' one-year duration-of-residence
laws to qualify for welfare. 66 The terms first appeared together in a ma-
53. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting the Free Exercise
Clause claim); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (rejecting the Estab-
lishment Clause claim).
54. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
55. Id. at 398.
56. See supra note 32.
57. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
58. Id. at 152 n.4 (1938) (arguing that restricting political process may "be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny" and protecting minorities "may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
59. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
60. Id. at 541.
61. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
62. Id. at 216 (Black, J., dissenting).
63. 333 U.S. 203, 223 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
64. See id. at 212 (majority opinion).
65. 394 U.S. 618, 660 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 627 (majority opinion).
2014]
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67jority opinion in Graham v. Richardson, which overturned state laws
68that discriminated against lawful resident aliens applying for welfare.
As this review shows, the test did not arise within the context of any par-
ticular rights provision or claim. 69 Rather, since 1971, it has become part
of the formulaic approach to all modem rights claims outside criminal
S 70
prosecutions.
Returning to the Sherbert version of strict scrutiny as applied to
religious freedoms, the standard limped along for twenty-seven years,
during which the Court famously protected Amish home-schooling but
72found ways to reject most claims. In 1990, the Smith Court threw out
strict scrutiny for most claims in an odd decision that preserved and iso-
lated the two protections the Sherbert standard had upheld-for the
67. 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
68. Id. at 382-83.
69. See Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What, When, and How: The Systemic
Incoherence of "Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219
(Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) (noting that the term "strict scrutiny" began in de-
scriptive comments).
70. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test
and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 357 (2006). The concept is occa-
sionally invoked in advocacy over other legal issues. See, e.g., Stephen J. Jones,
Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under
the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285
(2000); Donald L. Beschle, "What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust Scru-
tiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1986-
1987); Barry Kirschner, Constitutional Standards for Release of the Civilly Commit-
ted and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARIZ. L.
REV. 233 (1978).
71. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
72. See Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Nar-
row Definition of "Religion"?, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 362 (2012) (stating
that "free exercise strict scrutiny was rather feeble"); Steven D. Smith, Religious
Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May Be a Greater Loss Now
Than It Was Then, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2033, 2039 (2011) (stating that "in the cases
that reached the Supreme Court, religious objectors hardly ever won"); Adam Win-
kler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 809 (2006) (stating that most Sherbert-
era claims failed); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1417 (1992) (stating that
between 1980 and 1990, eighty-seven percent of religious-freedom claims failed).
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Amish and for unemployment claimants. 73 For all other claims, height-
ened review was available only for claims of deliberate discrimination
against a religious practice, which duplicates equal protection dogma.
74
The Court identified genuine problems with the strict scrutiny test,75 but
instead of replacing it with a more suitable alternative, the opinion left
most claimants without meaningful judicial review.
Congress reacted by attempting to restore strict scrutiny by stat-
ute. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) codified a
strong version of the Sherbert test.76 But in 1997, the Supreme Court in
City of Boerne v. Flores,7 7 held that Congress lacked power to impose
78the statute's requirements on state governments. Thus, RFRA survives
only as a limit on the federal government.7 9 By the time Congress tried to
find a way around Boerne, some members had acquired doubts about
granting strict scrutiny in all situations. 80 The resulting compromise, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), imposes a vigorous form of strict scrutiny to protect churches
from land use restrictions and to give incarcerated persons strong rights
to religious freedom. No other interests are protected. Some states re-
acted to Smith by adding their own religious freedom protections or
82
strengthening older ones.
In sum, today's federal law gives strong constitutional protection
to many religious freedom claims against the federal government, to reli-
gious expression and belief, to claimants who can prove deliberate dis-
crimination, and to some Establishment Clause claims. Powerful statuto-
ry remedies are available to churches opposing zoning and other land-use
73. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-
84 (1990). The Court also preserved decisions involving freedom of religious ex-
pression, but these are best grounded in the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 881-82.
74. Id. at 877, 881-82.
75. See id. at 888.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012).
77. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
78. Id. at 536.
79. See 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 32 (2006).
80. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Feder-
alism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local
Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 206 (2008).
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2012).
82. See Lund, supra note 25, at 477 n.67.
2014]
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laws, to incarcerated persons, and to workers seeking accommodations
from their employers. Other claims against state governments must look
to state law. This patchwork makes political sense, in that it satisfies
most religious interests with political clout. While the situation could
change quickly, there is no serious move afoot for Congress to do more,
and the Supreme Court shows no rustlings of change. But as Part III
shows, it leaves some minority faiths in the dust.
B. Outcomes
As noted above, religious claims to unemployment payments and
Amish home schooling won major decisions under Free Exercise strict
scrutiny, and their victories survived the Court's retreat in Smith." Reli-
gious schools also won important cases in the 1920s, and their claims
survive under the Amish decision's umbrella. 84 Since 1940, many reli-
gious claims to free speech have succeeded, though these depend on the
Free Speech Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause.85 RLUIPA has
made winners of churches trying to resist zoning laws, decisions that
86
save claimants money rather than directly protecting religious practice.
RLUIPA has also allowed many incarcerated persons to achieve greater
religious freedom. 87 In current disputes about health insurance coverage
for contraception, employers whose faiths represent a large percentage of
American voters and whose claims are based on indirect "participation in
evil" have prevailed. 88 Yet they can avoid participation (and save money)
83. See supra text accompanying note 73; Janet V. Rugg & Andria A. Simone,
The Free Exercise Clause: Employment Division v. Smith's Inexplicable Departure
from the Strict Scrutiny Standard, 6 ST. JOHN'S LEGAL COMMENT. 117, 135 (1990).
84. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881
(1990) (preserving Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and, by implica-
tion, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
85. See Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment
Protections: Why Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious
Freedom? 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 448 (2006); supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
86. See Alan C. Weinstein, The Effect of RLUIPA 's Land Use Provision on
Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1221, 1242 (2012).
87. See James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny,
95 VA. L. REV. 2053, 2117 (2009).
88. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (holding that business owners with religious objections to some forms of con-
[Vol. 13
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by dropping health insurance coverage, 89 and similar claims consistently
fail for the much smaller community of religious pacifists. Still more
dramatic are claims against the health care law in which the "substantial
burden" is merely to sign a form to claim the law's religious exemp-
tion."
Historically, the most famous losers were polygamists." In mod-
em times, the major losers are American Indian faiths that seek protec-
tion for sacred sites on public lands that had once belonged to their
tribes. All final appellate decisions have rejected their claims.93 The
dominant theory in these cases is that their claims fail to state a cause of
action.94 This is so notwithstanding severe impacts on believers-in its
leading decision in 1988, the Supreme Court admitted that proposed
government action "could have devastating effects on traditional Indian
religious practices" and could "virtually destroy the ... Indians' ability
to practice their religion." Other losers include pacifists,96 tax avoid-97
ers, most claimants who try to avoid drug laws, 98 landlords and busi-
traception did not have to offer them through their employees' health insurance
plans).
89. See Liberty Univ. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 99-100 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. de-
nied, 134 S. Ct. 683 (2013) (noting that large employers who fail to provide tax-
exempt health insurance for employees are subject to a tax, not a penalty); Marty
Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part ll-There is no "Employer Mandate,"
BALKINIZATION (Dec. 16, 2013, 9:36 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/
hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres-no-employer.html (stating that the amount of the tax for
not providing health care is much less than employers spend on health plans).
90. See Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Memorandum,
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-lafa/20133303f.pdf. One estimate is that
100,000 people nationally would support a pacifist political party. See Brief History
and Current Condition of the United States Pacifist Party, (Apr. 30, 2003),
http://www.uspacifistparty.org/history.htm.
91. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (accepting the claim that
submitting a government form for exemption from the law's contraception provision
constitutes a substantial burden on plaintiffs' religion).
92. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
93. See infra Part I11.
94. See infra Part III.D.
95. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.439, 451 (1988).
96. See Memorandum, supra note 90.
97. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
98. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-
79 (1990).
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ness owners who claim a religious right to violate anti-discrimination
laws,99 opponents of Sunday closing laws,100 and persons who seek to
avoid official photos and other forms of identification.0 1
As this review shows, comparing religious freedom claims based
on severity of impact reveals a legal scheme that makes little sense. Per-
sons denied unemployment insurance, churches that want to avoid zon-
ing laws, and contraception opponents have robust and vigorous legal
protection against moderate, mostly economic costs that governments
would impose on them. But Native American faiths have no judicial pro-
tection for outright denials of religious freedom. As explained below, re-
ligious freedom outcomes are rational only as an indirect byproduct of
the strict scrutiny test. 10
For Indian sacred site claims, critics have accused the courts of
assorted failings-lack of understanding of Native religions, giving own-
ership an improper veto on religious use claims, undervaluing religious
freedom, and others. 0 3 Critics assert that the strict scrutiny test has been
dishonored. 1°4 But what if the problem is that very test?
99. See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).
100. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
101. See Lauren N. Harris, Comment, You Better Smile When You Say
"Cheese!": Whether the Photograph Requirement for Drivers' Licenses Violates the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 61 MERCER L. REV. 611 (2010). Cf
Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48
B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007) (stating that religious defenses to anti-discrimination laws
vary depending on the protected class).
102. See infra Part II.
103. See, e.g., Marcia Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Reg-
ulatory Responses to American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE
L.J. 1623, 1633 (2004).
104. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Friend, Foe, Frenemy: The United States
and American Indian Religious Freedom, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 347, 415 (2012);
Kristen A. Carpenter, Old Ground and New Directions at Sacred Sites on the West-
ern Landscape, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 981, 995-96 (2006); Lt. Col. James E. Key,
This Land is My Land: The Tension Between Federal Use of Public Lands and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 65 A.F. L. REV. 51,62 (2010).
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II. UNMODIFIED STRICT SCRUTINY IS WRONG FOR RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTION CLAIMS
A. Compare Free Speech and Equal Protection with Religious Freedom
The basic difficulties of using a strict scrutiny or compelling
state interest test for religious freedom claims are revealed by comparing
them with claims for denial of equal protection and for abridgement of
free speech. For this purpose, claims of discrimination on the basis of re-
ligion are classified with other equal protection claims, and most reli-
gious speech claims are classified with other free speech claims. The
contrast is with claims that a facially neutral law or policy improperly
burdens freedom of religion such that litigants seek exemption from the
law. 1
0 5
One problem is separating important claims from trivial ones.,
For strict scrutiny review of complaints about denial of equal protection,
plaintiffs must allege and prove discrimination against members of a pro-
tected class recognized by the Supreme Court: race, national origin, or
religion.106 Other kinds of discrimination receive lesser forms of scrutiny,
most of them minimal review under the rational basis test.17 Claims
based on the Free Speech or Press Clause must invoke judicially-defined
forms of protected speech, including religious speech.I°8 There is a broad
array of these, but several common forms of speech receive little or no
protection: fraud and other commercial falsehoods, conspiracy, perjury,
and other forms of lying under oath.l°9 Narrower limits apply to pornog-
105. The problems with strict scrutiny of exemption claims do not apply to
claims of intentional discrimination or to most issues about religious speech. See su-
pra Part I. For empirical evidence of the discrimination-exemption distinction in
case results, see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 860-62
(2006).
106. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14.3(a)(iii) (8th ed. 2010).
107. See id. §§ 14.3(a)(i) & (iv).
108. See id. § 16.
109. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. , , 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544
(2012) (dictum); Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 161,
170, 173, 192-93 (2012).
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raphy, private defamations, nonverbal expressive conduct, and nondis-
criminatory regulation of time, place, and manner.1 o Thus, for both dis-
crimination and expression, the law has well-established categories that
distinguish claims based on their importance and on the importance of
competing values.
No like categories define claims to religious exemptions. One
claiming an illegal restriction on religious freedom (discrimination and
speech aside) can allege any apparently neutral law or decision to be a
substantial burden on free exercise."' Potential claims are endlessly
abundant. Countless ordinary government actions add to costs or other-
wise limit religious exercise. An open-ended standard that addresses each
claim with particularity could swamp the courts and trivialize the pro-
cess. Legislators and administrators who are asked for religious accom-
modations have ample discretion to manage the subject, but judges have
struggled to limit review to important claims.
A second problem is the proof needed for a prima facie case. For
claims of interference with free speech or unlawful discrimination, the
facts of plaintiffs' claims are concrete and capable of proof or disproof at
trial." 2 By contrast, claims to religious exemption when artfully made
are, with some exceptions, not traversable. Courts cannot adjudicate
questions of religious truth or dogma. 1 3 This results in most religious
exemption cases turning on the government's justification. Strict scrutiny
is supposed to erect a very high bar so that most laws that burden reli-
gious freedom should be overturned. 1 4 But trivial religious freedom
claims can state a prima facie case just as readily as substantial ones, so
that a test designed to make the government's justification very difficult
cannot operate as intended.
110. See Norton, supra note 109, at 192-93.
111. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990).
112. For example, the issue of truth or falsity must be proved in defamation,
fraud, and perjury cases. See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 21 (2014); 37 AM.
JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 7 (2014); 60A AM. JUR. 2D Perjury § 10 (2014). The
issue of intent to discriminate on the basis of race must be proved in discrimination
cases. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
113. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
114. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013). Actual applica-
tions of the test vary considerably, but all involve substantial levels of invalidation.
See Winkler, supra note 105, at 802.
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A third problem is the diversity of potential claims for religious
exemption. Free speech and discrimination claims are refined into pre-
scribed categories.1 15 By contrast, religious practices vary endlessly, and
their potential interactions with government are myriad as well, so that
categorical rules for organizing the law cannot be effectively formulated.
Risk that judicial responses will be inconsistent is much greater with re-
ligion than with speech and equality. For example, why should Amish
parents' religious objection to public school laws be protected but not
those of other fundamentalist parents? 116 Why should sabbatarians be ex-
cused from Saturday work for unemployment insurance purposes but be
forced to observe Sunday closing laws? 1 7 Why should one faith's sac-
rament be protected but another's not?"1 8 How are courts to sort out pris-
oners' claims to novel, religiously-mandated diets?
1 19
Given these problems, courts applying the compelling interest or
strict scrutiny test to religious freedom claims have sought ways around
it. The Smith Court instead simply abandoned the test for most claims,
120
but Congress forced us to consider it anew and in strengthened form. 121
115. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
116. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972) (sustaining
Amish religious claim to exemption from compulsory school attendance law), with
Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (reject-
ing a fundamentalist religious group's claim to exempt school children from reading
certain assigned texts because the religious group did not prove that the texts had a
coercive effect on the school children's practice of their religion).
117. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (sustaining sabba-
tarian's claim to unemployment insurance payments), with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (rejecting sabbatarians' claims to exemption from Sunday clos-
ing laws).
118. Compare Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006) (approving exemption for huasca, a hallucinogenic tea
used in religious ceremonies), with Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting ceremonial ingestion of peyote as exempt
from state drug laws).
119. See infra notes 195-200 & 368 and accompanying text.
120. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
121. See supra notes 71 & 81 and accompanying text.
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B. Prima Facie Case for Religious Free Exercise
Under the Sherbert rule, courts articulated a prima facie claim
for constitutional free exercise violations. Claimants had to allege that
the government's action substantially burdened their religious free-
dom. RFRA and RLUIPA codified this definition.123 Notably, the
phrase departs from the constitutional text, which forbids only laws that
"prohibit" free exercise of religion.12 4 This wording shift has played a
significant role in issues reviewed in this article. 115
Ordinary judicial procedures require proof of a prima facie• 126
claim's allegations by a preponderance of evidence. Elements of reli-
gious freedom claims pose special difficulties. Is a claim religious or
secular? Is there in fact a substantial burden on religious freedom? Is
plaintiffs claim sincere, that is, honest? When a claimant, or the agent of
an institutional claimant, asserts a substantial burden under oath, can the
claim's religiosity, burden, substantiality, or sincerity be tested by nor-
mal judicial process? Adjudication of these questions risks drawing secu-
lar courts into determinations of the veracity of professions of faith. In
1944, the Supreme Court held that truthfulness of a religious claim can-
not be adjudicated in a mail fraud prosecution,' 27 and similar rulings have
been made in legal disputes over ownership of church property.128 The
122. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. See also Jesse H. Choper, In Favor of Restor-
ing the Sherbert Rule-With Qualifications, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 221 (2011) (as-
serting that, as applied in other cases, the Sherbert rule amounted to a diluted version
of strict scrutiny).
123. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(b)(2), 2000bb-l(a), 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-l(a)
(2012).
124. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
125. See infra notes 243-248 and accompanying text.
126. See Preponderance of the evidence, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preponderance-of the evidence (last visited Sept.
26, 2014).
127. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
128. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
721-23 (1976) (holding that the Establishment Clause precludes civil courts from
interceding in disputes about church governance); Md. & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970);
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hill Mem'l Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969) ("The First Amendment prohibits a State
from employing religious organizations as an arm of the civil judiciary to perform
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Court's recent approval of a ministerial exception to employment dis-
crimination laws rejected judicial authority to review sincerity of
129grounds for terminating ministers. Are other free exercise claims dis-
tinguishable?
Religiosity is necessarily at issue because of the constitutional
text, often copied in state and federal statutes. Although often belabored
in academic writings 13 and the subject of serious contests in other na-
tions, 3 ' religiosity is seldom the focus of American free exercise law-
suits. One prominent contest was the extended battle between tax author-
ities and the Church of Scientology, which the Government eventually
conceded. 132 The Supreme Court's best-known ruling was its 1971 rejec-
the function of interpreting and applying state standards."); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119-20 (1952)
("Even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions
of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls."):
However, the Court modified its doctrine in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979),
when it adopted the so-called neutral principles rule. Id at 603-04 ("The primary
advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely secular in op-
eration, and yet flexible . . . free[ing] civil courts completely from entanglement in
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice."). The current rule involves
courts in evaluating church rules to a limited extent and has made church property
law much less certain.
129. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp't Op-
portunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. _, , 132 S. Ct. 694, 707-08 (2012).
130. See, e.g., BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012); Jared A.
Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question "Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine
Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (2005). To be sure, Ameri-
can law is filled with contested claims that the Establishment Clause requires equali-
ty between religious and secular beliefs despite the Free Exercise Clause's religious
preference. But these battles seldom depend on asking courts to decide whether a
belief system is a religion. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, The
Future of Religious Pluralism: Justice O'Connor and the Establishment Clause, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 895, 936-40 (2007).
131. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5 (1978) (holding belief to be political rather than reli-
gious). See Jilan Kamal, Justified Interference With Religious Freedom: The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the Need For Mediating Doctrine Under Article
9(2), 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 677 (2008).
132. See Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989);
Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some
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tion of a selective conscientious objector's exemption claim, although
that involved no contested claim of religiosity.1 3 Some opinions solemn-
ly "find" a claim to be religious in circumstances where the matter is not
seriously contested. 34 Moreover, dicta warn that secular beliefs are in-
sufficient. 135 However, it is difficult to find an important instance where
a court rejected an exemption claim by finding it to be secular. In the
context of statutory religious exemptions from vaccination requirements
for children, false claims are reported to be common, but state authorities
do not contest the matter.136 Hence while a limit in theory, proof of relig-
'37iosity is not an important one in practice.
C. Sincerity
Religious freedom opinions often recite that plaintiffs' claims
must be sincere, a way to ask whether they are truthful in the special con-
text of religion-not a test of factual truth but one asking whether a
claimant's assertion of religious belief is honest.' 38 Most reported claims
appear to meet this criterion, and defending governments often concede
it. Even when a claim might be doubtful, the claim itself is usually ac-
cepted as valid on its face, and governments usually lack any way to con-
test it. The criterion has been relied on to try to dismiss prisoners' claims
on the basis of backsliding, that is, failure to observe rules of one's al-
Thoughts on Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 109-10
(1997).
133. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460-61 (1971) (holding that
there is no constitutional right to exemption from conscription).
134. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972).
135. See, e.g., Frazee v. 11l. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 193 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Doswell v. Smith, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4644, *8-15 (4th Cir. Mar. 13, 1998).
136. See infra Part V.A.
137. There are occasional disputes about claims of religious persecution to
qualify for refugee status. Whether Falun Gong, a spiritual group that arose in China,
is a religion for purposes of refugee law has been contested in many other nations,
but its religious status is accepted in the United States. See Christopher Chaney, The
Despotic State Department in Refugee Law: Creating Legal Fictions to Support Fa-
lun Gong Asylum Claims, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 130 (2005).
138. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185. See generally 1 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 109-23 (2006).
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leged faith. 9 This sometimes works in that context because prison au-
thorities can observe claimants around the clock. However, in other con-
texts the sincerity criterion at best allows courts to dismiss claims artless-
ly made or belied by collateral admissions, both rare.140
To be sure, courts have often gone to elaborate lengths to "de-
cide" that a claim is sincere. 14 1 One way courts have purported to find a
claim to be genuine is by review of historical beliefs and practices of an
established faith. Amish home-schooling was grounded on centuries of
. 142
consistent practice. In Sherbert, the plaintiffs refusal to work on Sat-
urdays was an incontrovertible rule of her century-old church and sup-
ported in turn by the ancient scripture of the Hebrew Bible. 43 But the ir-
relevance of that approach was shown when Eddie Thomas's
unemployment insurance claim was based on a purely personal belief not
shared by the church to which he belonged; the Court held his claim to
be as good as theirs.1 44 Other personal beliefs not supported by rules of
an institutional faith have similarly survived dismissal as false or insin-145
cere. In Hobby Lobby, two companies claimed that compliance with
the Affordable Care Act's contraception requirement burdened their be-
. l146
liefs that forms of contraception are sinful. The claimed belief was
surely sincere, and the Government conceded the point. 147 However, later
in the litigation, the question arose whether the companies could drop
139. See infra notes 198-200 and 206 and accompanying text.
140. See Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and
Some Thoughts on Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 149
(1997).
141. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217 (1972).
142. See id.
143. See Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963); Genesis 2:2-3; Ex-
odus 20:9-10.
144. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (holding for a Jeho-
vah's Witness claimant notwithstanding finding that his refusal to work on tanks
based on pacifist beliefs was not mandated by the faith).
145. See, e.g., Frazee v. 111. Dep't of Emp't Security, 489 U.S. 829, 833
(1989); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
146. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __ 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2764-67 (2014).
147. See 134 S. Ct. at 2779. The Government argued that the Court should find
that corporations are not covered by the RFRA statute because determining sincerity
of corporations would be difficult, but that was not a challenge to sincerity of plain-
tiffs' claim. See id. at 2774-75.
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health care coverage and save money, thus suffering no burden. 48 In re-
sponse, plaintiffs claimed a religious duty to provide health insurance for
their employees.149 Providing health insurance for employees is a tenet of
no known faith, which raises doubts about its sincerity. Nevertheless, the
Court accepted the claim at face value. 50
D. Substantial Burden
Courts have been more willing to grapple with claims of substan-
tial burden on free exercise.' 5 ' Some decisions have attempted a limited
definition of burden;"' others have tried to distinguish substantial bur-
dens from trivial ones. 153 In Braunfeld v. Brown,5 4 which rejected a free-
exercise exemption from Sunday-closing laws, the Court's four-justice
plurality tested two possible limits.' The opinion pointed out that the
laws did not penalize religious exercise, so their burden was indirect, a
concept that could be applied without reviewing claims of religious
truth. 56 The opinion also relied on the government's claim that mandated
exemptions would cause many practical difficulties, implying a moderate
standard of review to justify restrictions that would avoid or at least re-
duce the need to determine burden and substantiality.' 57
Two years later, the Sherbert Court rejected both limiting con-
cepts, holding that indirect burdens were protected and requiring a com-
pelling state purpose to justify such burdens.158 The Sherbert dissenters
objected that the Court's mandated exemption "based on religious con-
148. Seeid. at 2776.
149. See id.
150. See id. At another point in the opinion, the Court cited Thomas v. Review
Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), to stress that such questions cannot be reviewed by courts.
See id at 2778.
151. See, e.g., Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1312-20 (10th Cir.
2010).
152. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606, 608-09 (1961).
153. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Authority 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
154. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
155. Id. at 606, 609 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451 (1961)).
156. Id. at 608-09.
157. Id. at 608.
158. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-07 (1963).
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victions would necessitate judicial examination of those convictions." 9
Somewhat inconsistently, the same opinion noted that the burden on peti-
tioner's religious freedom was "indirect, remote, and insubstantial."
160
RFRA and RLUIPA codified Sherbert on these points: indirect burdens
are protected, and the standard is strict.
16 1
Logically, the focal point of an effort to identify important bur-
dens on religious freedom is represented by the word "substantial" in the
formula. Trivial burdens should not be the basis for mandatory accom-
modations, at least not if any significant, competing interest is harmed. If
protection is not limited to direct burdens, can courts review substantiali-
ty in another way? In some circumstances, burden translates into a finan-
cial cost of compliance that can be measured and evaluated without the
need to adjudicate religious truth. But that works only so long as the
claimed burden is economic. If instead a claimant alleges that taxes are
sinful, an audit cannot determine substantiality or sincerity.
The Supreme Court's leading decisions reviewing religious at-11 162
tacks on taxes reveal the problem. An attack on a sales tax based simp-
ly on the claim that it made religious practice more expensive was reject-
ed. 63 However, Amish employers and workers sought exclusion from
the Social Security system based on their belief in looking after their
own, rather than simple economic burden. 164 The Court did not question
159. Id. at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 423.
161. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, §§
2(b)(1), 3(b), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488-89 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb(b)(1), 2000bb-1 (b) (2012); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-274, §§ 2(a)(1), 5(g), 114 Stat. 803, 803, 806
(2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-3(g) (2012).
162. See, e.g., Swaggert Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391
(1990); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
163. Swaggert Ministries, 493 U.S. at 391.
164. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257. The issue resurfaced in Liberty Univ. v. Lew, 733
F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 683 (2013). There, the plaintiffs
claimed that the Affordable Care Act requirement that they buy insurance or pay a
tax substantially burdened their religious practice. Id. at 85-86. The court held that
payment of a moderate, nondiscriminatory tax does not substantially burden one's
religion. Id. at 100. However, the Tenth Circuit called the payment a fine and held it
to be a substantial burden. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114,
1140-41 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff'd, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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whether plaintiffs had proved a substantial burden on their faith; it re-
jected their claim based on the government's justification that the tax
system could not function if compelled to recognize such exemptions.1
65
Religious freedom proponents attacked the decision as an unjustified sof-
166tening of strict scrutiny. A similar question was before the Court in at-
tacks on the contraception provisions of the Affordable Care Act. 161
Public school disputes have revealed other aspects of the prob-
lem. The Supreme Court's famous Yoder decision mandated an exemp-
tion from compulsory school attendance laws for Amish teenagers.168
The Court's opinion appeared to review in detail whether the claim was a
substantial religious burden. 169 The point was yet more apparent in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion: "How heavy is the burden? We
think it is clear the burden of compulsory education is a heavy one.",
170
Several points are notable. First, one can doubt whether that question
was seriously contested by the State. Second, by finding in favor of a
substantial burden, the courts did no more than other courts that have ac-
cepted a claim of substantial burden without traverse. In both situations
this moved the crux of review to the government's defense, as in the
Amish tax case. The hard question is whether a court can reject a claim
by finding it insubstantial.
As noted above, claims of religious belief have been found to be
sincere based on tenets of a well-established religious community, like
the Amish.17 Courts have found alleged burdens to be substantial on the
same basis. 173 However, no like proofs are possible for new faiths or for
individual claims not shared by a religious community. Thus, Eddie
Thomas's personal claim of substantial burden was upheld along with
sincerity of his claim. 74 Weightiness of a claim can and often does affect
165. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60.
166. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpre-
tive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994).
167. See supra Part II.C.
168. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
169. See id. at 209-13.
170. State v. Yoder, 182 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Wis. 1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
171. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-62 (1982).
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19.
174. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1981).
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legislative and administrative decisions on accommodations based on
politics. It cannot be considered by judges.175
After Yoder, fundamentalist parents in Tennessee claimed a reli-
gious exemption from public school reading assignments, but their claim
failed. 176 After stipulations that plaintiffs' claims were sincere and reli-
giously based, the trial focused on whether required readings substantial-
ly burdened plaintiffs' free exercise of religion. 177 The district court held
that they did, but the Court of Appeals' majority found no substantial
burden, and the Supreme Court denied review.178 Critics accused the
court of improperly adjudicating religious beliefs.17
9
Decisions involving Native American faiths have generated three
n 180
ways to restrict cognizable claims. In Bowen v. Roy, the first case to
reach the Supreme Court, welfare recipients objected to use of a social
security number for their daughter.181 A fragmented Court rejected their
claim on mixed grounds. 182 The one most relevant to this discussion was
the view that internal government operations were immune from Free
Exercise review.183 Next, the Court's one and only decision on Indian sa-
cred sites, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 
84
invoked Bowen's internal operations rule and added two others. 185 The
175. Id. at 715-16. However, despite this formal ruling and best efforts to be
impartial, one suspects that the number of burdened believers does in fact affect
judges, at least indirectly.
176. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir.
1987).
177. Id. at 1061.
178. Id. at 1069-70.
179. See, e.g., Richard M. Eisenberg, Must God be Dead or Irrelevant: Draw-
ing a Circle That Lets Me In, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 29 (2009); Stephen G.
Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937,
993-94 (1996); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out":
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L.
REV. 581, 592-93 (1993).
180. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
181. ld. at 695-96.
182. See generally id. (rejecting free exercise claim through a plurality and
three concurring opinions).
183. Id. at 699. There were six opinions, none for more than three justices,
mixing issues about jurisdiction with attempts to grapple with religious exemptions.
184. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
185. Id. at 448-49, 457-58 (rejecting Indians' sacred site claim).
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Court held that burdens qualifying for constitutional protection were lim-
ited to penalties imposed on religious exercise or to conditions imposed
on receipt of government benefits. 186 Impairment of a sacred site on gov-
ernment land was neither, so its burden on religion was not entitled to
constitutional protection.' 87 The Court also made a slippery-slope argu-
ment; if plaintiffs' claim were recognized, there would be no way to re-
ject more expansive variants.188
The Northwest Indian Cemetery dissent advanced another at-
tempted limit, saying that protection should be confined to obligations
that are "central" to a religion.189 But that limitation would surely require
courts to review issues of religious doctrine. Limiting claims to prohibi-
tions on religious exercise has support in the constitutional text, but add-
ing conditions on benefits has no logical support as a limiting principle.
Rather, it simply creates the strange disparity between protecting Mrs.
Sherbert's unemployment benefits while denying any protection for the
Northwest Indian Cemetery claimants' place of worship. The slippery
slope problem was more revealing-courts can only rarely determine
whether a claimed burden is substantial. So courts must rely on assessing
a claim's impact on the government or on other persons. For unemploy-
ment insurance, there did not seem to be a risk of excessive claims, but
for sacred sites, excessive claims loomed in the justices' imaginations.
When the Smith Court abandoned most religious exemption
claims, it stressed judicial incapacity to decide issues of religious be-
lief,'90 and it expressly rejected adjudication of centrality. 91 Then RFRA
and RLUIPA revived the prima facie case problem. Neither statute at-
tempts to define burden. RFRA originally defined exercise of religion to
mean "exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitu-
186. ld. at 449.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 457-58. A similar worry seemed to underlie other rejected claims
during the Sherbert era. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61
(1982). However, the Court did not deny Mr. Lee any judicial review; it found the
legal balance to be in favor of the government. Id. at 261.
189. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 474 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887
(1990).
191. Id. at 886-87.
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tion. ' ' This could have been read to incorporate the limits on covered
burdens adopted by the pre-Smith Court, including immunity of govern-
ment operations. But RLUIPA enacted an expansive definition of reli-
gious exercise to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief., 1 93 The same statute
amended RFRA to substitute this definition.' 94 While the statute did not
directly define burden, "any exercise" seems as broad as possible.
The Supreme Court's invalidation of RFRA as applied to states
reduced the statute's applications to federal actions only, and RLUIPA is
confined to land use regulations and institutionalized persons.195 The land
use context offers a secular way to address many claims of substantial
burden. So long as a religious plaintiff complains about the cost of com-
plying with zoning laws and the like, courts can evaluate the burden in
dollar terms. There could be instances when a claimed burden is based
on an article of faith rather than cost, but none has been reported to date,
nor is this likely to be a significant problem in the future. In any case, it
is of no relevance to the problem of sacred sites on public land.
RLUIPA's other application to institutionalized persons is more
directly related to the special problems of religious freedom adjudica-
tions. Prisoners make a great variety of religious claims. Were courts to
try to adjudicate religiosity, sincerity, burden, and substantiality in these
cases, they would often be drawn into determinations of religious truth.
To avoid that, many claims are deemed to state a prima facie case, mov-
ing review to the government's justification. During the Sherbert era, the
Court eased the problem by reducing the government's burden of justifi-
cation in the prison context. 196 Advocates rightly pointed out that this
was far from the verbal promise of strict scrutiny. 197 The terms and con-
192. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5(4),
107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4)
(2012)).
193. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L.
No. 106-274, §§ 7(3), 8(7), 114 Stat. 803, 806-07 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006)).
194. Id. at § 7(3), 114 Stat. at 806.
195. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, supra note
193.
196. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987).
197. See, e.g., Sara Anderson Frey, Religion Behind Bars: Prison Litigation
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in the Wake of Mack v. O'Leary, 101
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text of RLUIPA overrode that rule and required prisoners' claims to be
protected by strict scrutiny. As pointed out above, courts have found that
some claims can be summarily dismissed based on evidence of backslid-
ing. 118 The basis for these dismissals alternates between sincerity and
substantial burden depending on the factual record. 199 However, courts
have reined in over-reliance on backsliding, and many claims do not in-
volve alleged backsliding, particularly group claims. 00 These cases force
courts to confront the problems identified here.
E. Is the Hands-off Rule Mistaken?
Some reported decisions rejected religious freedom claims by
finding that plaintiffs failed to prove that their beliefs were sincere or
201
substantial. In other cases, dissenting judges made the same argu-
202
ment. In other words, these courts and dissenters rejected the dominant
rule that such questions are beyond secular courts' authority. 3 Scholars
have also questioned the rule's correctness. 204 Were courts empowered to
DICK. L. REV. 753, 761 (1997); Matthew P. Blischak, Note, O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz: The State of Prisoners' Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U. L. REV.
453, 479 (1988); Tara Kao, Note, They Can Take Your Body but Not Your Soul-Or
So You Thought-The Third Circuit's Application of the Turner Standard in Prison-
ers'Free Exercise Cases, 10 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 1, 19 (2005).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 139-140.
199. See Kevin L. Brady, Comment, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection:
Can Lapsing Prisoners Recover Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1431, 1438-42 (2011).
200. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 n.5 (2005) (assessing claims
for all Muslim and all Jewish prisoners); Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301,
1316-17 (10th Cir. 2010); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 887 (9th Cir. 2008);
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 200 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding a substantial burden
when prison removed Muslim prisoner from list of Ramadan participants after he
allegedly broke the Ramadan fast).
201. This finding was notably true for several Indian sacred site claims. See
infra Part III.A.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88-90 (1944) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 126-129.
204. See Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine:
What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009); Michael A.
Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493 (2013) (arguing that courts should
decide religious questions when no religious institution is available).
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adjudicate claims of religious truth, the difficulties addressed in this arti-
cle could be avoided.
Nevertheless, governing Supreme Court precedent clearly rejects
205
adjudicating religious truth on constitutional grounds. To challenge
that rule, one must address significant problems. Although claims based
on established religions can be reviewed by relying on published infor-
mation and testimony of established leaders, claims based on new faiths
or purely personal beliefs can be tested only be asking finders of fact to
evaluate whether plaintiffs' averments of faith are truthful. The risk that
such review will be arbitrary and prone to error seems obvious. The two
problems overlap when adherents of an established faith claim to believe
something the faith's rules do not require or to believe that a tenet of mi-
nor importance to the faith is crucial to them. Beliefs of established faiths
have an inherent advantage in seeking legislative exemptions. Preferring
them in adjudications of sincerity and substantiality would extend that
advantage. For these reasons, overturning the established rule seems nei-
ther likely nor desirable.
F. Government Justification as Primary Issue
As explained above, many skillfully framed claims that an ap-
parently neutral law or decision substantially burdens plaintiff's free ex-
ercise of religion cannot be disproved. 20 6 The strict scrutiny test therefore
shifts the burden of proof to the government, to justify its burden based
on the high barrier erected by the test-the need to prove that the gov-
ernment's imposition is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
20 7
RLUIPA spells out the burden shift. 2 0 8 Courts' ways around the test's se-
209
vere standard ofjustification have been ad hoc and often evasive.
205. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
906-07 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
206. See supra Parts IL.C-D.
207. See GREENAWALT, supra note 138, at 30, 32.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2012).
209. E.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(finding no cognizable burden despite obviously severe effects on religious free-
dom); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (easing the government's bur-
den of justification while purporting not to); Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987) (purporting to find no substantial burden as a
matter of law). The Court also relied on context to reduce the government's burden
2014]
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However, at least the outcomes can be rationally sorted out by
looking only at governments' justifications. The unemployment compen-
sation cases involved modest, measurable, and certain impositions on
government and on employers who pay premiums. 2  The schooling cas-
es are a bit more difficult but still fit the pattern. It was easy for Wiscon-
sin to comply with the Amish demand for home schooling but much
more difficult for Tennessee schools to tailor reading assignments to the
demands of each religious claimant. 211 The Wisconsin case involved
some uncertainty about fairness to Amish teens denied two years of
schooling, but evidence in the case met that concern-evidence about ef-
212ficacy of Amish home-schooling, not about religious truth.
Putting aside sacred sites for a moment, other failed claims from
the Sherbert era also fit the pattern. As the Court observed, exemptions
from use of social security numbers, participation in the Social Security
system, and Sunday closing laws would have potentially significant and
213
uncertain effects on government and on other persons. Prisoners'
claims from the Sherbert era were cabined by much greater deference to
government discretion than strict scrutiny promises. 214 More recently
prisoners' RLUIPA claims have been dismissed for backsliding.1 5 Land
use claims under RLUIPA can remove zoning protections from church-
es' neighbors and undermine open space, historic preservation, and traf-
of justification. E.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (pris-
ons); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military).
210. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations
on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United States, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1187,1220-21(2005).
211. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. In Yoder, public schools were
simply required to excuse Amish children from compulsory attendance; in Mozert,
schools faced the burdensome task of tailoring reading assignments to each dissent-
er. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 208-11; Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1059-60.
212. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222.
213. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 259 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
214. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987); United
States ex rel. Washington v. Fay, 217 F. Supp. 931, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Pierce v.
LaVallee, 212 F. Supp. 865, 869 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); In re Ferguson, 361 P.2d 417,
421 (Cal. 1961) (en banc); McBride v. McCorkle, 130 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1957).
215. See Brady, supra note 199.
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fic plans, but these effects are predictable and moderate;2 16 churches are
not glue factories. In Lighthouse Institution for Evangelism, Inc. v. City
of Long Branch and similar cases, courts rejected claims that would have
had more severe effects on government interests and on secular business-
217
es.
Claims for religious use of forbidden drugs always confront the
government's contention that exemptions risk diversion of the allegedly
sacred drug into the illegal marketplace, and this defense almost always
218
wins. For example, claimants in Smith put on a strong countering case
based on the carefully controlled use of peyote in the Native American
219Church, but failed nonetheless 9. A similar showing succeeded under
RFRA in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
220
but of course the legal standard was statutory, so Congress could modify
the decision if necessary. In any case, the drug cases fit the pattern-
religious exemption decisions depend on evaluating the exemption's po-
tential effects on government and on other persons.
216. See, e.g., Brain Alden, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do Religious Land Use
Protections Really Benefit Religious Land Users?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1779, 1787
(2010).
217. See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510
F.3d 253 (3rd Cir. 2007) (finding that an exemption for religious claimant would ex-
clude businesses serving liquor within 200 feet, so religious claimant was not simi-
larly situated to secular businesses). The decision has been criticized by religious
freedom advocates. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA:
Necessary, Modest, and Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021, 1060-64
(2012). However, the critiques do not address the case's special fact of harm to oth-
ers.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Lafley, 656 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996); Nesbeth v. United States, 870 A.2d
1193 (D.C. 2005). See also Howard Henderson, Natalia Tapia, & Elvira M. White,
Religious Freedom and Controlled Substances: A Legal Analysis, 46 CRIM. L. BULL.
304 (2010).
219. See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
913-14 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); David Perry Babner, The Religious Use of
Peyote After Smith 11, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 65, 67 (1991).
220. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
2014]
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W
G. Summarizing the Problems
Many claims for religious exemptions depend on matters of reli-
gious faith that cannot be reviewed by secular courts. Whether or not a
claim is honestly made, and whether or not it is in fact a substantial bur-
den on plaintiffs religion, will be untested. Every claim will state a pri-
ma facie case. Strict scrutiny then shifts the burden to the government to
prove that its law of general application is necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state purpose. The theory of strict scrutiny is supposed to impose
a very difficult standard to meet, so that the government should lose most
221
claims. Courts have sensed that this is an inappropriate scheme and
222have sought ways around it, not always forthright. Notably, the Smith
Court abandoned strict scrutiny for most claims, but with power to define
the rules, Congress brought it back.
Two aspects of the problem need to be highlighted. When a court
is confronted by an exemption claim that seems reasonable on the record
before it, it may be concerned that today's claim will be expanded in the
future and become unreasonable. If today's claim survives strict scrutiny,
how can an expanded claim be distinguished? This is a classic slippery-
slope problem that was relied on by the Court to reject an Indian sacredS• 223
sites claim. The second, related concern arises if a court is uncertain
whether the record before it fully reflects the impacts of a proposed ex-
emption order. Can it grant the order subject to later review and revision?
The strict scrutiny formula makes that difficult.
221
III. STRICT SCRUTINY AND NATIVE SACRED SITES ON PUBLIC LAND
Many religions have sacred sites, but they are much more im-
portant for indigenous faiths than others. Churches, mosques, and syna-
221. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. ... 133 S. Ct. 2411,
2417 (2013).
222. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
223. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457-
58 (1988).
224. To revise a ruling pursuant to the strict scrutiny formula, a court must find
that a compelling interest that cannot be served by less burdensome means had aris-
en in the interim. Thus, it would not be sufficient simply to find that the exemption
burdened other persons more than had been known at the time of the first ruling. See
infra text accompanying notes 353-360 (discussing impact on other persons).
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gogues are consecrated places, but adherents acquire ownership before
sacred designation, while most Native sites are natural places. 225 To the
extent American Indian tribes retain ancestral land, sacred sites on them
are subject to tribal control and protection. But many sites are on land
226lost to tribes during European-American settlement. Attempts to use
these sites for ceremony and worship are in practice limited to undevel-
oped government land, but many of the most important sites are natural
221places in parks and other public lands.
Until the recent past, Indian use of sacred sites on public lands
was available only when land managers had no competing purpose, and
judicial review was not sought for lack of favorable judicial precedents
or access to counsel. These limits have changed significantly over the
past half-century. The Sherbert decision in 1963 created an apparently
helpful legal precedent. 2 ' Tribes and Indian individuals acquired access
to counsel and the inspiration of the Civil Rights Movement.129 And fed-
eral law began to respect Native sacred sites on public lands, albeit sub-
230ject to Executive Department discretion. Congress passed AIRFA,
NEPA, and laws requiring adoption of formal plans for public lands,'
31
225. See infra Parts III.A-C. (all reported sacred sites claims involved natural
places).
226. Most contested sites are mountains or other heights. See infra Parts III.A-
C. Many were originally taken from tribes for mining, and this remains an important
competing interest, though recreational uses (skiing, climbing, etc.) are often the im-
portant competing uses today. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 258-259 and
276-279 (skiing); 294-296 (mining).
227. Veneration in Native faiths usually depends on natural conditions, so that
developed sites have lost sacred character. See Peter J. Gardner, The First Amend-
ment's Unfulfilled Promise in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites: Is the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act a Better Alternative? 47 S.D. L. REV. 68, 68-69
(2002). Sites held in private ownership are implicitly beyond the reach of religious
claims. The issue is rarely articulated, but it emerges in contests over leased sites on
public lands. See, e.g., infra notes 258-259 and 276-279 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
229. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN
INDIAN NATIONS 106-12 (2005).
230. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996). An earlier
executive order required federal agencies to inventory cultural properties on their
lands and to consider their protection. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8,921
(May 13, 1971).
231. American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(2012); National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); Fed-
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and a 1996 executive order requires executive branch agencies to ac-
232
commodate Indian sacred sites. Review under NEPA requires reports
on all impacts of a proposed land use, and the statutes that mandate land
use plans require reports on users. AIRFA and the executive order in turn
require accommodation of Native religious interest revealed by these
233
studies. However, inevitably public lands authorities have not accom-
modated all Indian claims, and lawsuits followed. As discussed below,
Native plaintiffs have prevailed in some trial courts but ultimately lost
every appellate decision.
A. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association
The Supreme Court's only review of an Indian sacred site claim
234
was Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association, de
cided during the Sherbert to Smith constitutional strict scrutiny era. Thus
it is the most authoritative precedent for claims seeking to protect sacred
sites on public lands. The case is also important for its facts and the
Court's reasoning. The Forest Service planned to pave part of a logging
road on federal land that passed through a place called Chimney Rock
and to license logging of the area.235 Chimney Rock is sacred to several
236Native tribes and is actively used for their religious ceremonies. The
Forest Service's environmental impact statement on the project included
a detailed report on religious use that provided the factual basis for Indi-
237
an plaintiffs' free exercise challenge. The district court concluded that
"construction of the Chimney Rock Section and/or implementation of the
Management Plan would seriously impair the Indian plaintiffs' use of the
238high country for religious practices" and sustained the challenge. The
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012)
(requiring land use plans for BLM land); National Forest Management Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1604 (requiring land use plans for Forest Service land).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996-1(a); 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1996-1(a); 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
234. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
235. Id. at 442.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594
(N.D. Calif. 1983), aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The district court first de-
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Supreme Court reversed, despite its recognition that "the logging and
road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects
on traditional Indian religious practices."
239
The Court's opinion relied on three grounds. First, it invoked the
Court's prior decision in Bowen v. Roy, which rejected a challenge to a
federal statute that mandated use of Social Security numbers in welfare
240
administration. In that case, applicants for benefits contended that their
religious beliefs forbade assigning a number to their young daughter. 24
The Bowen Court said that internal government affairs were immune to
Free Exercise claims.
242
Second, the Lyng Court adopted a narrow definition of substan-
tial burden on religious freedom that excluded the claims at issue in
Bowen and Lyng.243 While acknowledging that the Court "cannot deter-
mine the truth of the underlying beliefs," 244 the Court attacked the issue
using a crude exercise in textual interpretation and stare decisis reminis-
nied a preliminary injunction, finding no unlawful burden on free exercise so long as
plaintiffs had access to the site, citing several previous judgments. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Calif. 1983). But
after trial, the same judge ruled broadly in favor of the claimants. See id. at 594. The
opinion detailed effects on the site caused by clear-cutting. Id. at 594-95. It distin-
guished precedents based on the concept of centrality, finding that the current case
met that standard in contrast to others. Id. at 593-95. It then detailed the Govern-
ment's proffered justifications and found them less than compelling. Id. at 595-97.
The Court of Appeals majority agreed that the crucial issue was whether the site was
indispensable or central to plaintiffs' faith and whether the Government's actions
would substantially interfere. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,
795 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1986). The appellate court held that the trial record sup-
ported its judgment. Id. at 692-93. It also rejected the government's argument that
claims must be based on penalizing one's religious activities. Id at 693. And it re-
jected an Establishment Clause defense. Id. at 693-94. The dissent said plaintiffs'
proofs were insufficient. Id. at 701-03 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
239. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
240. Id. at 448-49.
241. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986). The majority did not explain
why unemployment insurance was different. Justice White thought it was not, so he
dissented based on precedent. Id. at 732 (White, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 699 (majority opinion).
243. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 456. Neither the majority nor the dissent used the
phrase "strict scrutiny," although both discussed the concept of compelling state in-
terest at length. The majority explained why that standard did not apply on the facts.
Id. at 456.
244. Id. at 449.
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cent of a first-year law class. The textual point stressed that the Free Ex-
ercise Clause forbids laws that "prohibit" the free exercise of religion
and opined that the government actions in Bowen and Lyng were not
• . 245
prohibitions imposed on plaintiffs. The Court also tried to distinguish
the leading decisions that had upheld free exercise claims. The unem-
ployment insurance decisions were said to involve penalties imposed on
• 246
religious exercise. The famous Yoder decision protecting Amish be-
liefs from Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law was said to in-
volve government coercion to violate religious beliefs.24 ' These were
held to be the only kinds of government actions prohibited by the Free
Exercise Clause, so that a cognizable burden had to fall into one of these
two categories. Because the burdens claimed in Bowen and Lyng fit nei-
• 248
ther category, they could not receive constitutional protection.
The third ground relied on by the Lyng Court was likely its most
important-a slide on the slippery slope. The opinion concluded that:
Respondents attempt to stress the limits of the religious
servitude that they are now seeking to impose on the
Chimney Rock area . . . . Nothing in the principle for
which they contend, however, would distinguish this
case from another lawsuit in which they ... might seek
to exclude all human activity but their own.. . within an
area covering . . . more than 17,000 acres of public
land.
249
245. Id. at 451. Professor Michael McConnell has effectively demolished that
point elsewhere. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-
standing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1486-88 (1990).
246. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450.
247. Id. at 458.
248. Several scholars have pointed out absurdities that arise from this reason-
ing. See, e.g., Lt. Col. James E. Key, This Land Is My Land: The Tension Between
Federal Use of Public Lands and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 65 A.F. L.
REV. 51, 69 (2010); Jeff Pinter, In Cases Involving Sites of Religious Significance,
Plaintiff Will Fall in the Gap of Judicial Deference That Exists Between the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 289, 313 (2004-05); Ann
M. Hooker, American Indian Sacred Sites on Federal Public Lands: Resolving Con-
flicts Between Religious Use and Multiple Use at El Malpais National Monument, 19
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 155 (1994).
249. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53.
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This reasoning is not absurd if one follows the strict scrutiny formula,
250but it leads to the question whether that formula should be modified.
B. Failures in the Courts of Appeals
The Supreme Court's narrowing of prohibited burdens used to
reject sacred site claims in Lyng had appeared in lower court cases, and
its concern about a lack of limiting principles had doubtless worried low-
er courts as well, despite going unmentioned. In a remarkable string of
defeats, every sacred site case reaching final judgment in a federal court
of appeals has failed, albeit on assorted grounds.
The first reported decision, Badoni v. Higginson,"' involved the
Glen Canyon Dam and reservoir, one of the largest and most controver-
252
sial damming projects in American history. In 1974, Navajo groups
and individuals sued to remedy violation of their free exercise rights
caused by the government's flooding of sacred places and enabling tour-
253ist visits to the sites. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
flooding claim, finding burdens on plaintiffs justified by the govern-
ment's interests in maintaining the capacity of Lake Powell and in assur-
254ing public access to the national monument. Next came Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,255 a challenge to flooding of sacred sites by
250. See infra Part IV.
251. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), aff'd, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
252. See id. See also Michael P. Lawrence, Damming Rivers, Damning Cul-
tures, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 247, 277 (2005-06).
253. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175-76. The dam was built between 1956 and
1963, and its reservoir, Lake Powell, reached capacity in 1980. See also Glen Can-
yon Dam Construction History, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR: BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION UPPER COLORADO REGION, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/
history.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). One of its effects was to create access by wa-
ter to Rainbow Bridge National Monument, a 290-foot high sandstone span that has
long been a Navajo and Paiute sacred site. Before Lake Powell, the monument, re-
mote and difficult to reach, had few visitors. Boat access on Lake Powell made ac-
cess easy, bringing hordes of additional visitors. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175-76.
254. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177-78. The court rejected the "enabling" claim
based on the "no coercion" concept relied on by the Supreme Court in Lyng. Id. at
178.
255. 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
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256
the Tellico Dam in Tennessee. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Indian plaintiffs failed to allege and prove that the dam would bur-
den beliefs that were essential to their faith.257
The next decision, Wilson v. Block, 25 rejected a challenge to the
expansion of a ski area on national forest land on Humphrey's Peak,
highest of the cluster known as the San Francisco Peaks, in northern Ari-
zona, and a sacred site to neighboring tribes.259 The Court of Appeals fol-
lowed the Sequoyah court's theory-that plaintiffs had failed to show
that expansion would burden beliefs that were central or indispensable to
261 211their faith. Wilson was followed by Crow v. Gullet, the only report-
262
ed dispute involving state rather than federal public lands. In Crow,
Lakota plaintiffs sued South Dakota officials claiming that sacred sites in
a state park were harmed by improvements and tourists, and that access
263to the sites was unduly restricted by park rules. The federal courts held
that there had been neither proof of undue burden on religion nor of co-
ercion to disobey the rules of plaintiffs' faith.
21
256. The dam was built by the Tennessee Valley Authority, and it flooded sev-
eral historical Cherokee towns. In addition to the Indian claim, Tellico Dam involved
prominent environmental conflicts. See generally WILLIAM WHEELER & MICHAEL
MCDONALD, TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM 1936-1979 (1986).
257. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164. The District Court had relied on the no-
coercion ground. 480 F. Supp. at 611-12.
258. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
259. See id. The Peaks tower over neighboring areas of high plateau and have
long been objects of veneration in the religions of neighboring Indian nations. See id.
at 738-39, 745. The ski area was built by the Forest Service in 1937 and later leased
to a private operating company. Id. In 1977, a new operator sought permission for
substantial expansion of the facility. Id. The Hopi and Navajo Tribes unsuccessfully
objected in administrative proceedings, then sued claiming denial of free exercise
rights. Id. The district court rejected their claim based on the no-coercion theory, that
the government had not compelled actions contrary to belief, nor had it conditioned
benefits on violation of religious duty. Id.
260. Id. at 742. Plaintiffs argued that the court had improperly decided a theo-
logical question. The court agreed that it should not do that, but denied that it had.
Id. at 744.
261. 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
262. See id.
263. Id. at 857. The sacred site involved is known as Bear Butte, in Bear Butte
State Park, located northeast of Black Hills National Forest. Id.
264. Id. at 858.
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In Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States,265 the
Inupiat plaintiff brought suit to stop federal oil and gas leases in sub-
merged land off the north coast of Alaska, which included a weakly ar-
266ticulated religious freedom claim. That claim was rejected by federal
courts based on lack of coercion, on the government's interest in pursu-
ing development of the area, and because the relief sought would create
267
serious Establishment Clause problems.
268United States v. Means, the last reported contest under the
Sherbert standard, involved another event in the ongoing Lakota quest to
recover South Dakota's Black Hills. 269 In Means, a group set up camp on
federal land, sought a permit, and challenged its denial on religious free-
dom grounds. 270 They won in the federal district court, but lost on appeal
271because they failed to prove coercion to violate their beliefs. In
Havasupai Tribe v. United States,272 the Tribe sued the Forest Service to
contest its approval of an application for a uranium mine in the Kaibab
National Forest.273 Their sacred site claim suffered double body blows
from the Supreme Court. It was filed about two months after Lyng, and
the district court's decision rejecting their claim was issued shortly after
Smith.
274
After Smith ended serious review of exemption claims and
RFRA was passed in reaction, there was a substantial gap in reported sa-
265. 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), affd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984).
266. See id. Plaintiffs' main claim, also unsuccessful, was ownership of sub-
merged land being leased. 548 F. Supp. at 185.
267. 548 F. Supp. at 188-89. The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam with-
out any mention of the free exercise claim. Inupiat Cnty., 746 F.2d at 571.
268. 858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988).
269. See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 753, 834 (1992).
270. United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247,,249 (D.S.D. 1985).
271. The disputed area comprised about 800 acres in Black Hills National For-
est. The district court's 1985 judgment found the Indians' religious interest in the
site to be essential and the Forest Service's denial of a permit to be arbitrary and ca-
pricious. See Means, 627 F. Supp. at 269.
272. Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.
1991).
273. The tribe made an aboriginal title claim to the site, also denied.
Havasupai Tribe, 752 F. Supp. at 1480.
274. See id. at 1485.
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275 . 276
cred sites cases.275 Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service, the
first reported RFRA case on federal public land, involved a further de-
277
velopment at the ski area on San Francisco Peaks. To achieve a more
reliable snow supply, the ski area's operator proposed to install equip-
278
ment to make artificial snow using recycled wastewater. Six tribes in-
279
voked RFRA to claim that wastewater would desecrate the mountain.
They lost in federal district court, won reversal before a circuit court
panel, and then lost before that court en banc. 280 The decision held that
RFRA had incorporated the limits stated in Lyng, including another
281
schuss down the slippery slope. Plaintiffs argued that Congress meant
to impose coverage based on the most pro-plaintiff decisions of 1963-
1990, because the statute mandates use of the compelling interest test in
282its strictest form. However, the statute's words did not address its ap-
plication to public lands. The court held that Congress intended to follow
Lyng rather than override it.
283
275. In 1995, the Miccosukee Tribe sued to claim that federal action flooding a
sacred site violated the Free Exercise Clause and lost based on Lyng. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 980 F. Supp. 448, 464-65 (S.D. Fla. 1997), aff'd,
163 F.3d 1359 (11 th Cir. 1998). No one cited RFRA or Smith in conjunction with
the case. The Tribe has a complex quarrel about Everglades water management by
the Army Corps of Engineers. It has pursued the matter on various statutory and
constitutional grounds in a series of decisions. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Fla. v. United States, 716 F.3d 535, 553-55 (11 th Cir. 2013). However, the Tribe did
not renew its religious freedom claim after the 1997 decision.
276. 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006), aff'd in part & rev'd in part by 479
F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007), on rehearing aff'd by 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
277. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 869-71.
278. See id See also Joshua A. Edwards, Yellow Snow on Sacred Sites: A
Failed Application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 34 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 151, 153 (2010). Legal standards for use of recycled waste water had been
met. See id, at 154.
279. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 869-70.
280. See supra note 276. But see Hopi Tribe v. City of Flagstaff, 2013 Ariz.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 482, 2013 WL 1789859 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), review denied,
2014 Arizona LEXIS 6 (reinstating state nuisance claim based on same events).
281. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1067-73.
282. Id. at 1072.
283. Id. at 1067-73. The opinion did not rule on the government's justifica-
tions.
The competing opinions in Navajo Nation laid out opposing in-
terpretations of the statute. The statute on its face specifies that claimants
must prove their prima facie case for substantial burden on free exercise
without any recognition of the difficulties that implies. The Court of Ap-
peals panel stressed that the amended statute protects "any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief," specified the least restrictive means test, and defined cognizable
claims based on substantial burden without direct connection to the word
284prohibit in the Free Exercise Clause. The district court emphasized the
express statutory purpose to "restore" the Sherbert rule and the statute's
express reference to the First Amendment. 285 The government relied on a
Senate Report stating that the statute follows the Lyng rule. 28 6 The deci-287Buneteth
sion has been sharply criticized in academic analyses. But neither the
courts' opinions nor most academic commentaries address the problems
outlined in this article.288
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
289
sion, 8 the next RFRA case, involved challenges to renewal of a license
for an 1898 hydropower project at Snoqualmie Falls in Washington
290State, a sacred site to members of the Snoqualmie Tribe. The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved renewal on conditions
that accommodated some of the tribe's religious concerns. Both the
Tribe and the power company sought review, but the Court of Appeals
284. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1031-33.
285. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 903.
286. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1074.
287. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering
Practices in American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 454
(2012); Ezra Rosser, Ahistorical Indians and Reservation Resources, 40 ENVTL. L.
437, 479 (2010); Peter Zwick, A Redeemable Loss: Lyng, Lower Courts And Ameri-
can Indian Free Exercise on Public Lands, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 241, 265
(2009).
288. For an exception on one crucial issue, see Carpenter, Limiting Principles,
supra note 287, at 389 ("The [Supreme] Court in Lyng denied the Free Exercise
claim in part because it could not see a stopping place.").
289. 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).
290. See id. at 1210-12.
291. Id. at 1211-12.
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affirmed." 9 On RFRA, the court held that the Navajo Nation coercion
293test controlled, so no cognizable claim was alleged.
The most recent sacred sites ruling, South Fork Band v. United
294.States Department of Interior, involved Barrick Gold's large mine on
295public land in Nevada. The company applied to expand the mine by
about 11%, including slopes of Mt. Tenabo, sacred to local Shoshone
bands.296 The court rejected the Shoshones' RFRA challenge by applying
the Navajo Nation coercion test.297 The Shoshones dropped their RFRA
298
claim prior to appeal of other claims. But after remand, they made a
new religious freedom claim, that the government had abused its discre-
299tion in applying the 1996 Executive Order. This claim did not involve
the strict scrutiny standard, but the court acted as though it did and re-
jected the claim on the ground that the Shoshones had failed to prove the
disputed land to be a sacred place.0 °
C. Temporary Successes
In Northwest Indian Cemetery and Means, two cases that Native
groups lost on appeal, plaintiffs won temporary victories in federal dis-
trict courts. 3 0 1 Two other wins in district courts survived because defend-
ants did not appeal. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Martinez was a 2003
suit that attacked the federal Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment's funding for a proposed shooting range within earshot of Bear
292. Id. at 1219.
293. Id. at 1210. Disputes on other legal grounds continue. See, e.g., 127
F.E.R.C. P62, 174, (F.E.R.C. 2009).
294. 643 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1205 (D. Nev. 2009), aff'd in part & rev'd in part
sub nom. S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior
588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009).
295. Id. at 1192.
296. Id. at 1205. For an earlier ruling in the case, see S. Fork Band v. U.S.
Dep't of Interior, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3664 (D. Nev. Jan. 7, 2009).
297. See S. Fork Band, 643 F. Supp.2d at 1207.
298. SeeS. ForkBand, 588 F.3d at 721.
299. S. Fork Band v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88510, at
*24-29 (D. Nev. Aug. 25, 2010).
300. See id.
301. See supra notes 243 & 281 and accompanying text.
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Butte, a sacred site in South Dakota. 30 2 The federal district court granted
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction based on both RFRA and RLUIPA.
303
Support for the subsidy lapsed, and the project was dropped, mooting the
304
case.
The other successful sacred site claim not yet overturned was
Comanche Nation v. United States,305 decided in 2008. In Comanche Na-
tion, the Army began to construct a warehouse at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,
directly south of Medicine Bluffs, a natural landform that is sacred to
Comanches and other local Indian people. 306 The Comanche Nation sued
to enjoin the project based on RFRA, and the federal district court grant-
ed a preliminary injunction in its favor. 3°7 After the decision, the Army
proposed to move the building to a new site, 30 and the Comanches coun-
tered with a broader claim.30 9 As of the writing of this article, no further
activity has been reported in the case.
302. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Martinez, Civ. 2003-5018, 2003 DSD 4
(D.S.D. Apr. 10, 2003), available at https://casetext.com/case/northem-cheyenne-
tribe-v-martinez (last visited Dec. 22, 2014). Bear Butte was also the site involved in
the South Dakota state park case. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
303. See generally Northern Cheyenne Tribe, Civ. 2003-5018, 2003 DSD 4.
The RLUIPA claim was based on the plaintiffs' claim to a property interest in the
state park.
304. See James D. Leach, A Shooting Range at Bear Butte: Reconciliation or
Racism?, 50 S.D. L. REV. 244, 291 (2005).
305. No. Civ-08-8439-D, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73283 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 28,
2008).
306. See id.
307. Id. The court refused to apply the Navajo Nation coercion test because the
Tenth Circuit had rejected it in a case challenging condemnation of private land. Id.
at *10. The court held that plaintiffs had shown a substantial burden on their faith.
The needs of the Army were a compelling purpose, but the Government failed the
necessity test because the Army had not considered alternative sites for the ware-
house. Id. (citing Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1996)). The Thiry
Court had held that RFRA applied, but plaintiffs had failed to show a substantial
burden on their religion. Thiry, 78 F.3d at 1495.
308. See Associated Press, Records Show Nearly $650K Lost in Medicine
Bluffs Case, NATIVE AMERICAN TIMES (last visited Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.nativetimes.com/news/tribal/2560-records-show-nearly-650k-lost-in-
medicine-bluffs-case. The court denied the government's motion to dismiss the case
as moot. See Comanche Nation v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98084
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 3, 2008).
309. See id.
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D. Analysis
What can we conclude from this litany? Of twenty-six rulings, at
least eleven invoked the coercion test to deny a cause of action. 310 At
least six other rulings purported to sit in judgment on the substantiality of
the religious claim; most decided based on the so-called "centrality" or
"indispensability" of the claimed interest.31 Three of these rulings re-
jected claims on this basis; three found the claimed beliefs to be central,
thus purporting to find a limiting principle.3 1 1 Only one ruling relied sole-
ly on the government's justification to reject a claim. 3 13 No opinion seri-
ously questioned religiosity or sincerity of a claim or relied on the Estab-
lishment Clause to reject a claim.
The record can be summarized to observe that twenty of twenty-
six rulings were made on unsatisfactory grounds. The coercion rule bi-
zarrely prefers rather modest claims like temporary unemployment com-
pensation over the profound impact shown in Lyng.314 The centrality rule
draws courts into improper adjudication of religious truth. Results in all
Supreme Court exemption decisions show that the only empirically
sound basis for sorting winners from losers is the impact on government
and other persons.3 But in most situations, courts resist relying on gov-
ernment justifications to reject claims, implicitly recognizing that strict
scrutiny's terms indicate that justifications should usually fail. From the
standpoint of those faithful to sacred sites, the main point is that well
over half the reported judgments took the easy way out by relying on the
coercion test.
3 16
310. See supra notes 247-248, 257, 259, 264, 267, 271, 275, 281, 293, 297 and
accompanying text (decisions that relied on the no-coercion rationale).
311. See supra notes 189, 238, 257, 260, 264 and accompanying text (deci-
sions that relied on finding centrality or its absence).
312. See supra notes 257, 260, 264 and accompanying text (not central to the
faith); see supra notes 189 & 238 and accompanying text (central or essential to the
faith).
313. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
314. See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text (severe impact in Lyng);
supra text accompanying note 210 (modest burden in the unemployment cases).
315. See supra Part II.F.
316. See supra notes 247-248, 257, 259, 264, 267, 271, 275, 281, 293, 297 and
accompanying text (decisions that relied on the no-coercion rationale).
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Another way to characterize the opinions is to recognize that, in
most cases, the judges were struggling with uncertainties about the im-
mediate and potentially negative effects of the plaintiffs' claims on the
government and on other persons. As a formal matter, these concerns
were put to distinct purposes. Under the Lyng-Navajo Nation rule, they
induced rulings finding no cognizable burden on religious freedom.3t 7 In
other decisions, they led courts to decide that a religious belief was not
central to the faith.318 This analysis also explains the successful sacred
site rulings in Northern Cheyenne Tribe and Comanche Nation: imposi-
tion on the government and on other persons was specific, modest, pro-
spective, and temporary, in contrast with other claims. 9 It also hints at
the Indians' success in other interim decisions by lower courts. 320 Tem-
porary and preliminary decisions can be revisited, alleviating concern
over uncertainties.
IV. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION?
A. Constitutional Equality, Non-Establishment, and Modified Compelling
Interest Review
One way out of exemption difficulties that is strongly advocated
by opponents of exemption claims is based on the constitutional principle
of equality. Exemption claims seek preferences for the religiously ob-
servant not enjoyed by others. This creates conflicts with constitutional
equality and anti-establishment norms, which readily qualify as compel-
ling state interests.321
Courts have often confronted the equality issue in Establishment
Clause challenges to legislative or administrative preferences for reli-
317. See supra notes 247-248, 257, 259, 264, 267, 271,275, 281, 293,297 and
accompanying text (decisions that relied on the no-coercion rationale).
318. See supra notes 257, 260, 264 and accompanying text (not central to the
faith); see supra notes 189 & 238 and accompanying text (central or essential to the
faith).
319. See supra Part IlI.C.
320. See supra notes 243 & 281 and accompanying text.
321. See Bret Boyce, Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion, 57 CLEV. ST.
L. REv 493, 513 (2009).
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gious activities. Analysts call these "discretionary" accommodations, and
many have been sustained. Supreme Court decisions have upheld reli-
gious exemptions from taxes, conscription, and laws forbidding discrim-
322ination in employment. The Court's opinions recite the metaphor that
"there is room for play in the joints" between the free exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses, 323 allowing the government to accommodate religion
beyond free exercise requirements without offense to the Establishment
324Clause. Tax preferences were sustained in part because they are shared
by all religions and by many secular activities, much reducing the claim
of religious preference. 325 However, the Court disallowed a legislative
preference for religious days off work,326 and dicta have warned general-
327ly that preferences may not go too far.
The preference issue also arises in free exercise lawsuits.12' The
Court faced the question in its 1961 Sunday closing cases. In both the Es-
tablishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause decisions, the opinions not-
ed that mandated accommodation would create a religious preference
that would be difficult to administer.329 The issue lurked on the periphery
of other decisions during the 1963-1990 reign of the Sherbert rule.330 It
322. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 720
(1970); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970); Corp. of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
338-40 (1987).
323. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 675. In 2002, subsidies for religious schools were sustained adding
an even more exacting stress to equality. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 653 (2002).
326. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985). Cf
TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (holding that employer did not violate Title
VII duty of accommodation because excusing Hardison from Saturday work was
undue hardship).
327. See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting); Walz, 397 U.S.
at 699; Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989).
328. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
329. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 451; Braunfeld, 336 U.S. at 608.
330. See Olsen v. C.I.R., 709 F.2d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1983); Equal Emp't Op-
portunity Comm'n v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 89 (1981) (holding
that a restaurant is not required to accommodate its facial hair standards for Sikh
employee); Balt. Lutheran High School Ass'n, Inc. v. Emp't Sec. Admin., 490 A.2d
701, 712 (Md. 1985) (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)).
was then stressed in Smith as a reason to abandon constitutional exemp-
331tion claims.
RFRA and RLUIPA brought the issue back in statutory form.
33 2
These are legislative accommodations, but they are obviously quite dif-
ferent from legislative or administrative decisions to make specific ac-
commodations. Courts are required to grant accommodations to all quali-
fying claimants unless the government can meet its burden to prove a
compelling purpose that cannot be achieved by less burdensome means.
Both statutes require accommodations based on a verbally enhanced ver-
sion of the Sherbert constitutional rule.333
As related above, the Court reviewed an Establishment Clause
attack on RLUIPA in Cutter.334 The Court rejected the claim that the
335statute is facially invalid. And the next year's 0 Centro decision up-
held an exemption claim under RFRA. 336 Although both decisions sus-
tained exemptions, the Court's opinions suggested a solution to the prob-
lems posed by the strict scrutiny test.
As is well known, the Establishment Clause has had a rocky
modem history, rigorously applied to forbid official prayers and other
religious activities in public schools, decisions that caused considerable
political backlash and revision within the Court as its membership has
become more conservative. 33 ' The Court's leading formal rule for its ap-
plication, known as the Lemon test, has suffered an extraordinary barrage
of criticism within and without the Court, yet has never been expressly
331. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89
(1990),
332. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (describing enactment of
the statutes).
333. See supra notes 76 & 81 (citing statutes). See also JOHN J. DELANEY,
STANLEY D. ABRAMS, & FRANK SCHNIDMAN, HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE: LAND
USE LAW, PRACTICE & FORMS § 46:6 (2012).
334. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712-13 (2005). See supra notes 21-24
and accompanying text.
335. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.
336. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 439 (2006). See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
337. See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 784 (2006).
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338jettisoned. Indeed, the Lemon test played a role in Cutter: the Court of
Appeals applied it to hold RLUIPA facially invalid.
339
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed,34 ° shunning the Lem-
on test. The Court also went to considerable lengths to point out how
RLUIPA as applied could violate the Establishment Clause, and how a
RLUIPA claim could be rejected by satisfying the statute's strict scrutiny
standard.
341
One important criterion added by Establishment Clause review is
for courts to weigh an exemption's effects on the interests of other per-
sons.342 One of the oddities of the strict scrutiny formula is its verbal lim-
343it to consider only interests of government. Yet the essence of many
limits on rights is to protect other persons, not government as a corporate
entity.344 This is particularly obvious in the case of religion when one re-
calls the many abusive practices that have been done in the name of
faith.345
American courts have at times invoked protection of other per-
sons as the basis for a compelling government purpose asserted in de-
338. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). For a summary of the criti-
cism, see Gey, supra note 337, at 731.
339. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 709
(2005).
340. Id.
341. See 544 U.S. at 722.
342. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (holding reli-
gious accommodation invalid because it imposed excessive burdens on other per-
sons); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(holding Establishment Clause violated when government action sends a "message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971) (stating that Establishment Clause analysis should consider effects of a gov-
ernment action on third parties).
343. See supra note 1 (wording of the test).
344. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S.
600, 619 (2003) (fraud); Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (def-
amation); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (private racial
discrimination). The point is explicit in the text of the European Convention. See in-
fra text accompanying note 399 (quoting and citing the European Convention stand-
ard for justifying burdens on religious freedom).
345. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD Is NOT GREAT: How RELIGION
POISONS EVERYTHING (2007).
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fense of a strict scrutiny claim.3 46 But omission of an "other persons" cri-
terion from the strict scrutiny formula nevertheless has consequences.
Evidence of an exemption claim's impacts on other persons is not re-
quired and thus is presented unevenly.14 Trial judges and juries are not
required to consider it or make findings about it. And it can be consid-
ered as a basis for decision only indirectly, by deeming the government
to have acted for that purpose. 34 8 One court said it was irrelevant. 34 9 By
contrast, Establishment Clause review makes it a necessary element.3 50
A second criterion affected by Establishment Clause review is
the burden of proof. When claimants make out a prima facie case, strict
scrutiny shifts the burden to the government and imposes a very high
barrier to success. 35 1 The Establishment Clause's countervailing standard
is some sort of heightened review and has suffered from considerable
352
uncertainty. However, its articulation in the context of the Cutter re-
view of RLUIPA implies a flexible standard that blunts the strict scrutiny
standard.
The context of Cutter was prisoners' religious burden claims au-
354thorized by RLUIPA. The Court's opinion gave a sympathetic account
of the plight of prisoners denied reasonable accommodations of their
faiths.355 At the same time, it responded to prison officials' concerns. 356 It
declared security needs of prisons to be a compelling interest in all cases,
346. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28-31 (1905) (small-
pox vaccination). See also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439, 452-53 (1988) (using interests of others as part of slippery slope argument).
347. Compare Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (considering
effects on third parties), with Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058,
1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (not considering effects on third parties).
348. See supra note 1 (wording of the test).
349. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1044-45 (9th Cir.
2007) ("Even if there is a substantial threat that the Snowbowl will close entirely as a
commercial ski area, we are not convinced that there is a compelling governmental
interest in allowing the Snowbowl to make artificial snow from treated sewage efflu-
ent to avoid that result."), vacated, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
350. See supra note 342.
351. See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 337-341 and accompanying text.
353. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-23 (2005).
354. See generally id.
355. Id. at 721.
356. Id. at 717, 720.
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rather than looking at the facts of each.357 On whether government costs
can justify rejecting an exemption claim, we are treated to an intriguing
footnote:
Directed at obstructions institutional arrangements
place on religious observances, RLUIPA does not
require a State to pay for an inmate's devotional
accessories. See, e.g., Charles v. Verhagen, 348
F.3d 601, 605 (CA7 2003) [sic] (overturning pro-
hibition on possession of Islamic prayer oil but
leaving inmate-plaintiff with responsibility for pur-
chasing the oil).358
Why not? How can cost be a compelling reason to deny a fun-
damental right protected by strict judicial scrutiny? But looking at the
other side of the issue, exemption claims usually seek freedom from gov-
ernment rules, not subsidies. In the prison context, every exemption im-
poses some costs on the prison. Many are modest, or at least clearly justi-
fied to equalize opportunities for observers of faiths not served by the
existing chaplaincy system. 359 The Court is willing to entertain the claim
that costs are relevant in determining prisoners' claims, but the standard
for doing so is hard to discern.
These limits may not live up to the theory of strict scrutiny.
360
But the limits were in an opinion, for a nearly unanimous Supreme Court
that purports to be based on Congressional intent. 36 The Court also said
357. Id. at 717.
358. Id. at 720 n.8. See also id. at 726 ("Should inmate requests for religious
accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institution-
alized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution, the facility
would be free to resist the imposition. In that event, adjudication in as-applied chal-
lenges would be in order.").
359. See Taylor G. Stout, The Costs of Religious Accommodation in Prisons,
96 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1214 (2010).
360. No specific criticism of the Cutter dicta has been found. For a general ar-
gument for construing RLUIPA strictly, see Laycock & Goodrich, supra note 36.
361. The Court's opinion was unanimous save Justice Thomas's opinion argu-
ing, as he had previously, that the Establishment Clause is not properly imposed on
state governments under the incorporation doctrine. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 731 (Thom-
as, J., concurring).
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that RLUIPA's function is to alleviate "exceptional government-created
burdens on private religious exercise."
362
References to congressional intent in Cutter and 0 Centro imply
363flexibility in applying RLUIPA and RFRA in another way. Statutory
accommodations can be modified legislatively. The process is difficult,
but it relieves reviewing courts of the worry that recognizing an exemp-
tion that turns out to be excessive could be overturned only by judicial
reversal. Statutory rules are inherently more flexible, which seems to
have made the 0 Centro Court more willing to allow use of a potentially
harmful drug than was the Smith Court in interpreting the Free Exercise
Clause.
364
The Cutter dicta, properly applied, could meet most of the prob-
lems of religious strict scrutiny explained in previous sections. Because
review often depends exclusively on governments' justifications, the im-
portant need is for a standard based on a more realistic burden of justifi-
cation than that provided by the strict scrutiny formula's words. Proper
respect for religious freedom should maintain heightened review but
without the formal rigidity of strict scrutiny. The Cutter opinion's dicta
365
appeared to meet this standard.
One way to evaluate whether the Cutter dicta could achieve a
workable system to address the flaws in the strict scrutiny formula is to
review reported claims for apparent excesses in either direction, whether
too many apparently just claims are denied, or accommodations appear
to be made for doubtful and expensive claims. In the prison context,
366
some reviewers have warned of excessive costs, while religious rights
362. Id. at 720 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
363. Id. at 714; Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 419 (2006).
364. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing and citing
Smith).
365. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 731-33.
366. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 359 (stating that RLUIPA is often overly bur-
densome on prisons; the Establishment Clause defense underutilized); Morgan F.
Johnson, Comment, Heaven Help Us: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act's Prisoners Provisions in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court's Decision
in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 585 (2006) (asserting
that prisoners who invent religious claims are preferred over others and that the Cut-
ter dicta, while helpful, did not go far enough).
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367
advocates have claimed insufficient protections for religious needs.
Many reported cases are diet claims, based on both established and non-
368traditional faiths. Some are of doubtful sincerity, but so long as securi-
ty and costs set outer limits, the system seems workable. RLUIPA's oth-
er subject, land use regulations, has had major effects on local zoning
369laws, but these seem to be what the statute intended. Based on this ev-
idence, the statute has not generated a flood of doubtful claims.
As explained above, a principal failing of the present set of rules
is to deny any review to claims involving Indian sacred sites on public
lands. The main concern underlying that rule is courts' inability to identi-
fy a limiting principle to cabin future expansion of claims. 370 The Cutter
dicta offer an answer, albeit one that may be challenging to apply in the
sacred sites context. Invoking Establishment Clause review, Cutter re-
quires courts to evaluate impacts that an accommodation has on interests
of others. 371 This is a limiting principle both in the context of an existing
claim and as a way to limit future claims. The difficulty is to articulate
how to weigh competing claims that will often be diffuse and uncertain.
However, requiring courts to consider the question will generate much
better records on the question than have past adjudications that ignored
it. Moreover, there are reported decisions arising from challenges to sa-
367. See, e.g., Aaron K. Block, Note, When Money is Tight, is Strict Scrutiny
Loose?: Cost Sensitivity as a Compelling Governmental Interest Under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 237
(2009) (Cutter's allowance of costs to justify regulations mistaken); Derek L. Gau-
batz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA's
Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 501 (2005) (broadly supporting the
statute).
368. See Gaubatz, supra note 367, at 558-59.
369. For criticism, see generally MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL:
RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); Bram Alden, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do
Religious Land Use Protections Really Benefit Religious Land Users?, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1779 (2010); Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Ap-
plications and Troubling Implications of RLUIPA's Land Use Provisions, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2006). For defense, see Laycock & Goodrich, supra note
36; Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 717 (2008).
370. See supra text accompanying note 249. See also infra notes 417-419 and
accompanying text (describing the additional problem posed by polycentric dis-
putes).
371. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13
cred sites accommodations granted by federal land managers. 372 Indians'
opponents raised Establishment Clause claims in which impacts on them
were at issue. 37 3 Courts appear to have handled these claims well, sug-
gesting that they could readily determine accommodation claims by Na-
tive religious groups on the same basis.
374
B. Hobby Lobby Reviews Cutter
Nine years later, the Cutter dicta were battle-tested in Hobby
Lobby and other challenges to the contraception mandate imposed under
the Affordable Care Act.17 In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that for-
profit corporations can maintain religious freedom claims under the Re-
376ligious Freedom Restoration Act. As usual, plaintiffs' sincerity and
substantial burden claims sailed by on assertion alone, so the case de-
pended on the government's compelling interest and lack of a less bur-
densome alternative. 377 The majority ruled for plaintiffs, reasoning that
the government could readily provide contraception coverage for plain-
tiffs' employees by extending its exemption for religious non-profits.
378
The principal dissent by Justice Ginsburg invoked her Cutter opinion to
argue that interests of the employees should outweigh the claim.379 Jus-
tice Kennedy's short concurrence stressed his view that "the record in
these cases shows that there is an existing, recognized, workable, and al-
372. See, e.g., Access Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 499 F.3d 1036 (9th
Cir. 2007); Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir.
1999).
373. See Access Fund, 499 F.3d at 1042-46; Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 820-22
(finding lack of harm to plaintiffs).
374. SeeAccess Fund, 499 F.3d at 1045.
375. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014).
376. Id. at 2767-75.
377. Id. at 2754, 2757.
378. Id. at 2779-83.
379. See id. at 2790 n.8, 2801, 2802 n.25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The major-
ity addressed Cutter in a detailed footnote quoting Cutter: "It is certainly true that in
applying RFRA 'courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested ac-
commodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries."' Id. at 2781 n.37 (majority opinion)
(citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)). But the footnote discussed
the point obliquely and failed to explain the phrase "adequate account." Id.
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ready-implemented framework to provide coverage [of contracep-
tives] .,38o
Whether the alternative is as readily available as the majority
claimed is at issue in numerous other lawsuits in which religious non-
profits claim that filing the government's form to obtain exemption from
the contraception mandate is a substantial burden on their religious free-
dom. The issue has divided lower federal courts.38 Three days after an-
nouncing its Hobby Lobby decision, the Court granted an injunction
pending appeal in Wheaton College v. Burwell,382 so long as a party noti-
fied the government in writing without using the form. 383 The majority's
theory was that contraceptive coverage by other means was as readily
384
available without use of the contested form. The female justices were
385
again unpersuaded and dissented in strong terms. One wonders what
the majority will do if a religious organization argues that giving any no-
tice to the government offends its faith substantially.
The crucial question is whether the majority interprets religious
claims under RFRA to trump all or most others, or at least one majority
justice would join dissenters to balance them against harm to other per-
sons. Nothing in these decisions gives a clear answer. Even so, the deci-
sions strongly protect claims to religious freedom made by some of the
nation's most powerful and privileged persons. Hobby Lobby Stores has
no problem paying its female employees in cash that they can spend on
"sinful" contraceptives, but is substantially burdened if it must pay them
with government-subsidized insurance coverage. 386 Even more refined is
387Wheaton College's objection. Meanwhile, Indian sacred sites can be
entirely destroyed without any judicial review.
380. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
381. See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 573 U.S. __ ... 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2811
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
382. 573 U.S. , 134. S. Ct. 2806 (2014)
383. 134 S. Ct. at 2807.
384. Id. ("Nothing in this interim order affects the ability of the applicant's
employees and students to obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved con-
traceptives.").
385. Id. at 2807 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
386. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S., _ 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014).
387. See Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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C. Lessons from Abroad
Adjustments in the standard for religious exemption claims are
suggested by examining religious freedom provisions in other human
rights regimes. In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and rights regimes were
made part of the postwar constitutions of West Germany, Italy, and Ja-388
pan. Since then, human rights guarantees have blossomed in other in-
389ternational provisions, national constitutions, and statutes. Even totali-
tarian states have felt the need to enact guarantees, albeit lacking any
means of enforcement. 390 All democratic regimes include a guarantee of
religious freedom.391 But no other nation or system has adopted the
American strict scrutiny formula as its enforcement framework; the Su-
392preme Court of South Africa deliberately refused to do so.
When the U.S. Bill of Rights was adopted, enforcement and its
problems were but little understood. One consequence was failure to at-
tempt any articulation of limits on rights. Thus, the First Amendment
flatly says "no law" shall impair rights to expression and religious free-
dor.393 Of course these rights have never been read that way; the Su-
preme Court has defined the competing interests that allow re-
. . 394
strictions. The need to do so is particularly obvious for the religion
clauses because, applied in absolute form, they would conflict with one
another.
395
Drafters of modem rights regimes have thought limiting provi-
sions ought to be part of their texts.396 Some have adopted general provi-
388. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990).
389. See id. at 6.
390. See id at 29.
391. See id. at xvii.
392. See Christian Educ. South Africa v. Minister of Educ. 2000 (4) SA 757
(CC) at para. 31 (S. Afr.).
393. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
394. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. __ , 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544
(2012) (dictum). Justice Black tried to fashion a scheme faithful to the demand of
"no law," but it never captured a majority of the Court. See Edmond Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
549, 553,559 (1962).
395. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
396. See, e.g., infra notes 397-399.
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sions that do little more than legitimate the American practice of judicial
definition.397 But prominent ones go further. Most important is the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), because of its extensive ter-
ritory (now forty-seven nations) and record of enforcement by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. 398 Its provision protecting freedom of
religion includes the following limiting language:
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.399
Several aspects of this provision bear on American religious
freedom litigation. First, the ECHR explicitly recognizes that rights
should be limited to protect "the rights and freedoms of others.,, 400 As
explained above, that limit is omitted from the strict scrutiny wording,
though it can be recognized indirectly or in Establishment Clause re-
view.40 1 In judgments of the European Court, this criterion is carefully
402
reviewed in every case.
A second aspect of ECHR law that could usefully be applied to
American exemption claims is the formal procedure the European Court
397. See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act,
1982, c. 11 (U.K.) ("The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.").
398. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Eu-
ropean Convention].
399. Id. at art. 9.
400. Id.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 343-344.
402. See Joined Cases C-71 & C-99/1 1, Germany v. Y, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. pa-
ra. 5; Kokkinakis v. Greece (A260-A), Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 (1993); Stephanos Stavros,
Freedom of religion and claims for exemption from generally applicable, neutral
laws: lessons from across thepond?, 6 E.H.R.L.R. 607, 620 (1997). The same limit
appears in European Convention art. 10, which governs freedom of expression. Eu-
ropean Convention, art. 10.
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has established to apply the requirement that limits be "prescribed by
law" and "necessary in a democratic society. 403 The procedure is de-, . 404
nominated as the doctrine of "proportionality" and is quite elaborate.
Some aspects of the doctrine relate to the European Convention's multi-
national dimension and have no application within the United States. 40 5
But part of its core meaning is to impose on the legislative and executive
branches the obligation to give full consideration to religious freedom
claims. Failure to do so sends a claim back to those branches with orders
to review the claim and interim protections to preserve it.4°6 This allows
the political branches, which have much broader discretion, to have a fo-
cused opportunity to address the claim. On review by the court, the doc-
trine provides for review of any limitation's necessity, allowing the court
to assure adequate consideration of religious freedom under a flexible
standard.40 7
A third useful change in the strict scrutiny formula applied to re-
ligious freedom claims would be to eliminate the formal notion of shift-
ing the burden of proof. The familiar concept is that when a plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the government
408 409
to justify its actions. RLUIPA codifies this shift. Such burden-
shifting is inappropriate in religious exemption cases when claimed reli-
gious beliefs are not subject to ordinary standards of proof. One conse-
quence of the traditional rule is to contribute to the unease judges feel in
uncertain cases. As already noted, inability to revisit a ruling on new
facts can generate rejection of a claim.4 1 Making subsequent review pos-
sible could lead to greater willingness to order relief in uncertain cases.
There may be implicit recognition of this point in the absence of any ref-
403. European Convention, art. 10.
404. See Nicolas A.J. Croquet, The European Court of Human Rights' Norm-
Creation and Norm-Limiting Processes: Resolving a Normative Tension, 17 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 307, 340 (2011).
405. See Carolyn Evans & Christopher A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in
the European Court of Human Rights, 2006 BYU L. REV. 699, 723 (2006).
406. See id. at 720-21.
407. See id. at 724.
408. See PUBLISHER'S EDITORIAL STAFF, PLAINTIFF'S PROOF OF A PRIMA FACIE
CASE § 1: 1.40 (Thompson Reuters 2013).
409. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006).
410. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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erence to plaintiffs' burden of proof in most religious exemption judg-
411
ments, in contrast to free expression and racial discrimination cases.
Yet another adjustment the ECHR system makes to address
problems arising from the strict scrutiny standard is its jurisprudence on
manifestation of religion. The text of Article 9 protects freedom "to man-
ifest one's religion or beliefs. 412 By expanding protection to nonreli-
gious beliefs, the European Convention achieves greater equality for be-
lievers and non-believers, the lack of which is a point of frequent
academic attacks on American law.413 However, this addition expanded
the difficulties of defining justified limits to the right. The ECHR re-
sponded by limiting the scope of occasions that qualify as manifestations
of religion or belief 414 Breaking a general law based on a claim that
one's acts or omissions were inspired by one's beliefs is not sufficient to
invoke Article 9.415 Rather, the act or omission must qualify as a mani-
416festation through worship, teaching, practice, or observance.
The European Convention system adjusts review of some claims
to recognize that they are what Professor Fuller called "polycentric" dis-
putes, affecting parties not before a court.4 1 This factor makes courts re-
luctant to grant strict scrutiny protection that will be very hard to dis-
418lodge later. Professor Fuller advanced this as a reason to deny review.
Modem courts are more likely to allow review but on standards that take
419the polycentric problem into account.
411. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 565, 573
(1998).
412. European Convention, art. 9.
413. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 130.
414. See PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF RELIGION: UN AND EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 210 (2005).
415. Id. at211.
416. See PAUL M. TAYLOR, FREEDOM OF RELIGION: UN AND EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 210-91 (2005).
417. See Lon. L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 394-404 (1978).
418. See id.; see also Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98-99 (Utah
1991).
419. See Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Polycentrism and the International Joint Com-
mission, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1695, 1701 (2008).
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D. Effect of a Changed Rule on Sacred Site Claims
Would a more flexible standard change outcomes? Strong parti-
sans of religious rights will object to this proposal because it appears to
reduce protection for religious rights and fails to protect at least some sa-
cred sites. But some proponents of Native rights will approve a standard
that achieves significant success as superior to the existing string of fail-
ures. If the proposed changes make no difference to outcomes, there
would be no reason to consider them. Therefore it is important to try to
assess what would have happened to prominent failed cases under the
proposed legal concept.
Lyng is again the most useful case to begin the review. The
Court's opinion worried about hypothetical, more restrictive claims Indi-
ans might make. 42 Plaintiffs strongly denied any such intent, and critics
- • 421
have argued this was improper speculation. However, the Court's re-
marks reflected some of the concerns discussed in this article-that ex-
panded claims could not be traversed and would more severely impact
422interests of the government and of other users of the land. Any court
order would be very difficult to revisit under a strict scrutiny standard.
The Court's failure to say anything about the standard of review implied
discomfort with the Sherbert standard.
The proposed alternative standard would address each of these
concerns. First, it would have required a full record of effects of the pro-
posed restriction on other persons. This would define a protective order
by the claims made and the effects proved. New claims or facts would
allow revision. If necessary to shoehorn into the strict scrutiny test, the
Court could have used the maneuver stated in Cutter and the Comanche
Nation case: declaring all Forest Service plans compelling interests and
423resting the decision on manipulation of the necessity requirement . On
the record in Lyng, this should have readily sustained the Indians' claim.
420. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452-53
(1988).
421. See, e.g., Dussias, Friend, Foe, Fremeny, supra note 104, at 415; Carpen-
ter, Old Ground, supra note 104, at 995-96.
422. See supra text accompanying note 10.
423. See supra notes 357-362 and accompanying text.
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The site was undeveloped, so no investments would have been lost,
424
and, despite exaggeration by the Court, it was of relatively modest
425
size. The unimportance of the site to the government was revealed by
subsequent scrapping of the plan and adding the site to a wilderness ar-
426
ea.
The proposed standard also shows why the Comanche Nation
judgment was correct.42 7 The only competing interest was that of the
Army, impact on it was readily apparent, and review focused on insisting
that the government adequately review and account for religious inter-
ests.4 28 The proposed standard would have improved the discourse in
other sacred site decisions, but a positive outcome would have been more
difficult in many instances because sites involved more preexisting in-
vestment, greater geographic extent, and more potential interests of other
persons than did that in Lyng or Comanche Nation. One reaction to this
consideration is to claim that religious freedom should not take a back
seat to property rights, but this is naYve. No one is going to order destruc-
tion of a substantial structure against its owner's will to meet a religious
freedom claim even when the owner is a government. One opinion re-
jecting a sacred site claim hypothesized a religious claim to require de-
429
struction of the Lincoln Monument. What makes reported sacred site
claims plausible is the fact that none was fully developed; plaintiffs in
these cases sought to forestall planned projects.
Battles over the ski area on San Francisco Peaks illustrate several
•• 43043
difficult points. The facility was built in 1937.4 1 A legal challenge be-
424. See Nw. Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586,
590, 595-96 (N.D. Calif. 1983), aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
425. See id at 596-97.
426. See Amy Bowers & Kristen Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of
Conquest: The Story of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
in INDIAN LAW STORIEs 487, 527 (C. Goldberg et al., eds. 2010).
427. See supra notes 305-309 and accompanying text.
428. See Comanche Nation v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73283
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2008).
429. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D. Utah 1977), aff'd, 638
F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
430. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008);
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
431. See supra note 259.
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fore any construction would have avoided conflict with a vested interest.
Because of the very large area at issue, a proper record of competing in-
terests would have been particularly challenging.432 However, until such
a record is required, it is speculative to assume its content. The adminis-
trative record is part of the picture, but it is limited to subjects the Forest
Service selects and to parties who choose to participate.
A number of other reported decisions have suffered from the
same problem as Navajo Nation-tribes' claims were made after signifi-
cant investment had been made in developments they opposed.433 In Se-
quoyah and Badoni, the Tellico and Glen Canyon dams were built.
43 4
However, at least in Badoni, protection of the tribal interest would not
have required stopping the project.435 In any case, tribes are now active in
protecting their interests, so that missed chances to anticipate develop-
ments are much less likely.
V. OTHER ISSUES OF NOTE
Aside from the special case of Indian sacred sites, areas in which
the strict scrutiny test generates notable challenges will often involve ei-
ther conflicts between parents' beliefs and their children's medical inter-
est, or situations in which claimants have strong incentives to make false
claims. This section discusses some important examples.
Competent adults have a common-law right to refuse medical
436treatment that now has constitutional stature. But American govern-
ments have established medical rights for, and duties to, children against
parents whose religious or other beliefs deny some or all forms of medi-
cal treatment. The usual threshold for state compulsion is a substantial
threat of death or severe impairment. 43 ' Thus, faith-healing parents have
432. See Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1064 (Peaks area comprises 74,000
acres).
433. See Laurie Ensworth, Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights to the
Use of Public Lands, 63 B.U. L. REV. 141, 143-45 (1983).
434. See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608, 610
(E.D. Tenn. 1979); Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175.
435. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176 (secondary claim to restrict tourist visits to
the sacred site, Rainbow Bridge).
436. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271-79 (1990).
437. See Ann MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health
Care Decisionmaking for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21
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been required to permit medical treatment of their children facing these
threats,438 and Jehovah's Witness children have been given blood trans-
-. • 439
fusions over their parents' objections. Constitutional attacks on these
laws have failed, a rather clear instance where rights to religious freedom
are limited by competing rights of other persons, here children who are
under the age of consent to forgo medical treatment." 0 Governing consti-
tutional rules for these matters are fairly stable.
Two other situations present more active and uncertain conflicts.
One arises from disputes over mandatory vaccination laws. The other in-
volves conflicts over the practice of infant male circumcision. Both add
insight to the issues addressed in this article.
A. Conflicts over Vaccination of Children
State laws requiring vaccinations against smallpox were passed
at various times in the nineteenth century, each time overriding deter-
mined opposition. Constitutional attacks failed, beginning with Jacob-
442son v. Massachusetts in 1905. During the twentieth century, all Ameri-
can jurisdictions adopted laws requiring vaccination of children against a
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 725, 725-29 (1994) (issue governed mostly by stat-
utes; variations noted).
438. See Massie, supra note 437, at 730 (law differs somewhat among states).
439. See Divorce, Blood Transfusions and Minor Children, DIVORCE, BLOOD
TRANSFUSIONS, AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES, http://jwdivorces.bravehost.com/
blood.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
440. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See also Jennifer L.
Hartsell, Comment, Mother May I . . . Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining
Medical Treatment for Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV.
499, 512-19 (1999). Because constitutional defenses fail, most state legislatures
have been persuaded to pass statutory exemptions for parents who are adherents of
spiritual-healing faiths, and these generate other constitutional issues. See id. at 519-
22.
441. See Alicia Novak, Comment, The Religious and Philosophical Exemp-
tions to State-Compelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1101, 1104-07 (2005); James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence 0. Gostin,
School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90
KY. L. J. 831, 842-50 (2001-02).
442. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); see also Zucht v. King,
260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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list of contagious diseases that grew steadily.443 At the same time, most
state laws included or added exemptions to mandatory vaccination based
on religious objections, and a large minority added philosophical objec-
tions unrelated to religion.4n All states also exempt children who should
not be vaccinated for medical reasons such as allergies. 44 The exemp-
tions for belief-based objectors reflect two political forces: the significant
influence of organized religions, 446 and the relationship of vaccination to
compulsory school-attendance laws. Mandatory vaccination and school
attendance were connected in some nineteenth-century laws, and in the
twentieth century the connection was adopted in every state. 447 Children
are required to attend a public or approved private school, and admission
to either is conditioned on vaccinations. 448 Without belief-based exemp-
tions, some children would be kept out of school, undermining educa-
tional goals and straining compulsory attendance laws.
Evaluating vaccination laws requires basic scientific information
on contagion and vaccines. No vaccine should be required absent proof
that its benefits clearly outweigh its costs, but only one current require-
ment might fail this test.449 The next issue is the concept of herd immuni-
ty. A contagious disease will disappear from a community when a certain
percentage of residents are successfully vaccinated, a number that varies
among diseases by ease of contagion from around two-thirds to more
than 90%.450 A small number cannot be vaccinated because of allergies
or other medical reasons, some vaccinations do not successfully achieve
immunity, some children are too young to be vaccinated, and some par-
443. See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 441, at 850-52, 867-75.
444. See Allan J. Jacobs, Do Belief Exemptions to Compulsory Vaccination
Programs Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 75 (2011).
445. See id.
446. This is revealed by the wording of many statutes limiting religious ex-
emptions to members of recognized or established faiths. See Hodge & Gostin, supra
note 441 at 861.
447. See Jacobs, supra note 444, at 74.
448. See id. at 77. Approved home schooling is subject to the same require-
ment. Id.
449. See Allan J. Jacobs, Needles and Notebooks: The Limits of Requiring Im-
munization for School Attendance, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 171 (2010) (detailing scien-
tific and legal grounds for compulsory vaccination and finding them satisfied for all
required immunizations except Gardasil, which is required in few jurisdictions).
450. See Jacobs, Belief Exemptions, supra note 444, at 79.
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ents do not vaccinate children for social reasons unrelated to belief.
451
Thus, belief-based exemptions defeat herd immunity when their number,
combined with those itemized in the last sentence, reduces a communi-
ty's percentage of successfully vaccinated persons below the pertinent
452threshold. Recent outbreaks of contagion and empirical data about
vaccinated children show that herd immunity in the U.S. is declining to
some extent, which has led medical experts to call for tightening or elim-
inating belief-based exemptions.453
This scheme generates constitutional law issues worthy of the
densest law-school exam question. Starting with equal protection, all ex-
isting statutes discriminate between belief-based exemptions based on
religion and those with other motivations.454 All exemptions discriminate
against those who undergo the expense, inconvenience, mild pain, and
455
risks of vaccination. If herd immunity is achieved, those exempted are
free-riders who enjoy the benefit. Exemptions for medical reasons are
456favored over belief-based exemptions in some states. All of these dis-
criminations have generated lawsuits, mostly unsuccessful. One form
that has been struck down is the requirement in some states that exemp-
tion for religious belief be based on tenets of an established religious or-
ganization. 411 Only one state court has overturned all belief-based ex-
emptions as unjust discrimination against the vaccinated. 458
As usual, equal protection claims can readily be morphed into
due process. Children whose vaccinations did not succeed and those who
cannot be vaccinated for medical reasons are required to attend school
451. See id. at 81-83. Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist.,
672 F. Supp. 81, 90-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
452. See Jacobs, Belief Exemptions, supra note 444, at 83.
453. See id. at 80-81.
454. See id. at 75 (stating that thirty-two states exempt only for religious be-
liefs, sixteen for both religious and philosophical beliefs, two for neither).
455. See id. at 76-77.
456. See id at 79-80.
457. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F.
Supp. 81, 90-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
458. Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979). In addition, West Vir-
ginian statutes allow medical exemptions only. W. VA. CODE § 16-3 (1999).
and are subjected to increased risk of contagion by the presence ofS 459
classmates enjoying belief-based exemptions.
The claims of vaccination opponents, both religious and nonreli-
gious, connect to three issues addressed in this paper. First, the array of
issues encounters the uneven set of protections for religious rights.
460
RFRA, the federal statute imposing strict scrutiny, applies only in Wash-
461
ington, D.C., and other places under federal jurisdiction. Heightened
federal constitutional review is available only when discrimination be-
462
tween religious faiths can be shown. Second, claims of legitimate reli-
gious objectors raise profound issues about rights of other persons. Par-
ents who deny vaccination to their children put them at risk of death or
bodily harm, as is the case of other refusals of medical treatment. In this
instance, the risk extends as well to other persons in the community who
are subjected to increased risk of contagion.
One issue posed by vaccination laws is that falsely claiming reli-
gious exemption is easy. In practice, states make little effort to verify the
463
sincerity or substantiality of exemption claims. Were states to do so,
they would often confront the hands-off rule forbidding secular authori-
ties to determine matters of faith. 464 The no-enforcement practice eases
the tension over preference for religious exemptions over other forms of
465genuine belief; both get a free pass. However, the vaccination context
involves a possible motive of pure selfishness-to enjoy herd immunity
without undergoing the costs and risks of immunization. At the same
time, there are surely honest claims of religious obligation involved in
this and other medical exemption disputes. The strict scrutiny test is a
poor tool to sort out these issues.
459. See Jacobs, Belief Exemptions, supra note 444, at 95-108 (analyzing due
process claim).
460. See supra Part I.A.
461. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 3 & 74 and accompanying text.
463. See Jacobs, Belief Exemptions, supra note 444, at 76-77; Linda E. LeFe-
ver, Comment, Religious Exemptions from School Immunization: A Sincere Belief or
a Legal Loophole?, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1047, 1047-48 (2006).
464. See supra Part lI.E.
465. See supra note 130.
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B. Disputes About Infant Male Circumcision
Infant male circumcision has deep religious roots for the Jewish
and Muslim faiths that did not originate in any medically-based inter-
est.466 There have been occasional efforts to forbid the practice based
largely on prejudice, but the practice otherwise continued without legal
467
conflict over many centuries. Three recent developments have raised
legal questions. The first, and most straightforward, are efforts to insure
sanitary conditions to protect boys against infection and disease and to
468
require anesthesia to prevent pami. A second involves invocations of
modem concepts of individual rights to claim that infant circumcision be
banned as an unwarranted invasion of children's rights.469 Countering
that, the third is recent medical evidence that male circumcision has im-
470portant health benefits.
466. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Circumcision: Cultural-Legal Analysis, 9 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 497, 512-16, 519-20 (2002).
467. See id. at 517. Botched circumcisions have long been a subject of tort
law. See id. at 504-06; Matthew R. Giannetti, Note, Circumcision and the American
Academy of Pediatrics: Should Scientific Misconduct Result in Trade Association
Liability?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1507 (2000).
468. See Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the United States & Canada v. New York
City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 12-CV-7590, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis
4293 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013), vacated, Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the United States
v. New York City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 13-107-CV, 2014 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15726 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2014); American Academy of Pediatrics, Task
Force on Circumcision, Circumcision Policy Statement, 103 PEDIATRICS 686 (Mar.
3, 1999), available at
http://pediatrics.aapublications.org/content/l 03/3/688.full.html.
469. See Miller, supra note 466, at 502; Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the
Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue
from Their Infant Children?: The Practice of Circumcision in The United States, 7
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 87 (1998/1999).
470. See New Data on Male Circumcision and HIV Prevention: Policy and
Programme Implications, WHO/UNAIDS Technical Consultation on Male Circum-
cision and HIV Prevention: Research Implications for Policy and Programming (6-8
March 2007), http://libdoc.who.int/publications/2007/
9789241595988_eng.pdfua=l; see also American Academy of Pediatrics Task
Force on Circumcision, Circumcision Policy Statement (Aug. 27, 2012), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/130/3/585.full.html (cautiously favoring
circumcision if done under sanitary conditions and with anesthesia).
To date there have been few court contests, although one report-
ed case raised an issue reviewed in this article. At issue in Central Rab-
binical Congress of the United States & Canada v. New York City De-
partment of Health & Mental Hygiene, was New York City's mandate of
written consent of at least one parent to a traditional form of circumci-
sion mandated by some orthodox Jewish authorities because the proce-
dure risks transmission of contagious disease. 471 There can be little doubt
that banning circumcision would impose a substantial burden on ob-
servant Jews (and Muslims), but was it a substantial burden to require
written consent of one parent? The only federal right at issue was the
472Free Exercise Clause. Under the Smith standard, plaintiffs had to prove
discrimination against their faith.473 They lost this claim in the District
Court but won on appeal. 474 However, the trial court also reviewed their
claim under the New York State Constitution, which involved a balanc-
ing test that constituted a heightened form of review, albeit well short of
strict scrutiny.4 75 For this test, the court held that "the regulation imposes
a relatively minor burden on the free exercise of religion" that was out-
476
weighed by the city's interest.
In 2011, circumcision opponents in San Francisco gathered
enough petition signatures to put a proposed ban with no religious excep-
tion on the city ballot.477 A judge ruled that the measure was beyond lo-
cal power under California law, and the state legislature then amended
the law to make that judgment explicit.4 78 There was considerable public-
ity when a German court ruled, in a case involving a Muslim boy, that
471. Cent. Rabbinical Cong., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15726, at *2-3, *6-21.
472. See id. at *3-4.
473. See id. at *23-25.
474. Id. at *4-5 (applying constitutional strict scrutiny).
475. See Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the United States & Canada v. New York
City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 12-CV-7590, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis
4293 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013) at *106-07.
476. See id. at* 108.
477. See Andrew E. Behms, Note, To Cut or Not to Cut?: Addressing Pro-
posals to Ban Circumcision Under Both a Parental Rights Theory and Child-
Centered Perspective in the Specific Context of Jewish and Muslim Infants, 21 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 925, 925 (2013); Michael J. Weil, Note, The Friendly Separa-
tion of Church and State and Bans on Male Circumcision, 45 CONN. L. REv. 695,
698 (2012).
478. See Behms, supra note 477, at 925 n.4; Weil, supra note 477, at 698 n.8.
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religious circumcision inflicted grievous bodily harm and could be pros-
ecuted.479 The German parliament promptly modified the ruling to pro-
480tect religious practice, but in 2013, the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe published a resolution that appeared to call for the Eu-• . • 481
ropean Union to outlaw male as well as female circumcision. In gen-
eral, conflict about the subject appears to be growing, so that difficult is-
482
sues may reach the courts.
C. False Claims
As this paper has stressed, claims for exemption from general
laws can be made by false assertions that courts cannot test, which the
unmodified strict scrutiny test over-protects. 483 There is no evidence that
actual sacred sites claims by American Indian faiths have been false, but
fear that they might be expanded, possibly falsely, has haunted their
,- I484
claims and caused most to fail.4
Difficulties arise in situations where claimants have strong in-
centives to misrepresent religious claims. As explained above, vaccina-
tion is an important field in which exemption claims threaten the health
of many.ass Another situation discussed above involves prisoners, but as
479. See Landgericht KOin [LG] [District Court of Cologne] May 7, 2012, 151
Ns 169/11, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 2128, 2008 (Ger.), available
at http://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/lgs/koeln/lg_koeln/j2012/
151 Ns 169 11 Urteil_20120507.html; Bijan Fateh-Moghadam, Criminalizing
male circumcision? Case Note: Landgericht Cologne, Judgment of 7 May 2012 -
No. 151 Ns 169/11, 13 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1131-1145 (2012), available at
http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/index.php?pagelD= 11&artlD=1464 (acquitting
doctor because he had acted in good faith with his understanding of the law at the
time).
480. BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [CIVIL CODE], Dec 20, 2012,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, § 1631 (d) (Ger.).
481. See B.C., Circumcision and the law: A clash of entitlements, THE
ECONOMIST (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2013/
1 /circumcision-and-law. The Assembly is an important advisory body to the Coun-
cil of Europe.
482. See id.
483. See supra Part 11.
484. See supra Part 11.
485. See supra Part V.A.
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explained, the Cutter dicta and the prison setting seem to create a reason-
486
able balance that allows courts to address the issues sensibly.
An additional area of potential conflict involves claims for refu-
gee status based on alleged religious persecution; however, the facts of
persecution can be tested by ordinary methods of proof.487 An invented
religion would be unlikely to support such proof, so the only issue in
practice is whether a claimant is an adherent of a faith against which per-
secution is provable.488
Yet another twist is presented by lawsuits to claim religious ex-
emptions from the Affordable Care Act.489 Because the statute is strongly
contested politically, there is an incentive to mask political opposition in
religious garb.490 Existing claims offer at least one hint of false faith, and
they involve serious doubt about the substantiality of burdens. Business
claimants with employee health care plans claim that indirect provision
of insurance for contraception is a substantial burden, while paying
women sufficient wages to buy it is not. 49 1 These claimants could drop
coverage and pay a tax lower than the existing cost, and they claim this
492
option is also a substantial burden. Parties entitled to a religious ex-
486. See supra text accompanying notes 354-362.
487. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the "Reli-
gious Imposter" Problem: A Case Study of Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt, 43
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1179 (2010).
488. See id. at 1230-33. But see Christopher Chaney, The Despotic State De-
partment in Refugee Law: Creating Legal Fictions to Support Falun Gong Asylum
Claims, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 130, 172 (2005) ("[T]he extent to which adjudi-
cators are forced to bend the law to accommodate the USDOS results in a burden of
credibility so low that it practically invites fraudulent claims of Falun Gong mem-
bership. The resulting success of Falun Gong asylum claims provides valuable am-
munition to human smugglers in the PRC.").
489. See supra Part IV.B.
490. See, e.g., S.M., Religious Objections to Obamacare: The Butterfly Effect,
THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/
democracyinamerica/2014/01/religious-objections-obamacare.
491. See Liberty Univ. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72, 99 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 683 (2013).
492. See Marty Lederman, How to Understand Hobby Lobby, in SCO-
TUSblog (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-how-to-
understand-hobby-lobby/.
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emption claim that signing the official form to claim it is a substantial
burden.493
CONCLUSION
Religious claims for judicially crafted exemptions from general
laws have troubled American courts since they became common in the
1960s. The Supreme Court's attempt to apply strict scrutiny to constitu-
tional free exercise claims generated outcomes inconsistent with the test.
For this and other reasons, the Smith Court abandoned that regime but
failed to replace it with rules better suited to the subject. Congress inter-
vened with strong statutory protections for certain kinds of claims, some
of which were disallowed by the Court, but the statutes failed to address
the difficulties that had plagued the constitutional regime. The result is a
patchwork of protections that favors the politically powerful, shielding
churches from zoning laws and large employers from accommodating
the reproductive rights of their female workers but leaving American In-
dian faiths unprotected. The Court's Cutter dicta suggested a way to
modify the practical application of the statutes, but the Affordable Care
Act contraception cases put that possibility in doubt. The main basis for
exclusion of Indian claims hangs in the balance. One must hope for a
path to restore judicial review of those claims.
493. See supra notes 381-385 and accompanying text; Michael C. Doff,
Obamacare and Participation in Evil, VERDICT (Jan. 15, 2014), available at
http://verdict.justia.com/2014/01/1 5/obamacare-participation-evil.
